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I. INTRODUCTION
The woman sat in her lawyer's office, seething with indignation,
fighting back tears. She had hired him to represent her in her divorce
almost five years ago. Now, only a few weeks after she had married for
the second time, the woman said she did not know which problem to tell
him about first. The day after she and her new husband returned from
their honeymoon, her new husband's ex-wife served him with a motion
to increase child support. The papers did not claim that his daughters'
expenses had increased or that his income had risen, which it had not,
but claimed that his ability to pay had increased because he had married
a woman with a high-paying job.
As part of the divorce settlement in 1983, the woman had received
exclusive occupancy of the home for the benefit of her and her ex-hus-
band's two sons. She thought she and the boys could live there until the
younger boy turned eighteen, still seven years away. Yesterday, how-
ever, the client's ex-husband telephoned to ask when she was planning to
put their home on the market. Her ex-husband said his lawyer had told
him her remarriage required her to sell the home and divide the proceeds
with him. Just before hanging up, her ex-husband announced that his
wife was pregnant and planning to quit work, so she, the client, should
not expect any increases in her child support from now on. Who, she
wondered, was going to support his new wife's other child? His new
wife's ex-husband had not paid a dime of child support in years.
She wanted to scream. She had thought her divorce was the worst
crisis she would ever have to endure. Now, without any preparation or
[Vol. 22:73
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forethought, she found herself in the midst of another, even more confus-
ing and stressful legal entanglement. As both a parent and a stepparent,'
she found she could not see her dilemma in black and white. She did not
think she should have to support her stepdaughters. She sympathized
with her new husband's ex-wife, however, because she knew how difficult
it was for a single mother to raise two children on only her earnings and
a typical child support award. She had always felt her ex-husband did
not contribute his fair share in time or money to raising their sons, but
she had never expected his new wife to contribute. She had, however,
been looking forward to the financial advantages her remarriage would
bring her sons. In short, she had been assuming their stepfather would
contribute to their support. Instead, it seemed she and her new husband
were going to get the short end of both sticks: her new husband would be
paying more child support if she kept her high-paying job. However, she
could not afford to quit her job because she could not count on increased
support from her ex-husband, who would soon be the sole support of his
wife, stepchild and a new baby.
The lawyer began by noting his client's questions:
(1) Could she be forced to contribute to her stepdaughters'
support?
(2) Could her ex-husband require her to sell her home?
(3) Could her ex-husband limit his support payments to her
because his wife was having a baby?
(4) Could her ex-husband limit his support payments to her
because he was now the sole support of his stepchild?
1. As used throughout this article, a stepparent is a person who has married someone
who has a child or children by a prior marriage or nonmarital relationship. Unless otherwise
specified, the term "stepparent" refers equally to the spouse of the parent with whom the child
lives and the spouse of the parent with whom the child does not live. The parent with whom
the child lives is called the "custodial parent" and his or her spouse is called the "custodial
stepparent." The parent with whom the child does not live or with whom the child lives
substantially less than half the time is called the "noncustodial parent" and his or her spouse is
called the "noncustodial stepparent." The noncustodial parent is obligated by court order or
agreement to pay child support to the custodial parent and is therefore frequently referred to
as the "obligor-parent."
Not all commentators have applied the term stepparent to the noncustodial parent's
spouse. See Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70
CORNELL L. REv. 38, 38-39 (1984), which defines "step family" as a "household consisting of
a married couple and children who are the natural or adopted children of only one spouse."
Such a definition would include both parents' new spouses within the term "stepparent" only
in joint custody situations. For the purpose of analyzing stepparent support obligations during
marriage, this definition is inadequate. The parent's spouse most acutely aware of (usually)
her support obligation is the noncustodial parent's spouse who witnesses money regularly flow-
ing from her household to that of her husband's ex-wife.
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(5) Was there anything she and her new husband could do to
protect themselves from this double onslaught and secure their
financial future?
These questions are not easily answered in California despite the
fact that the laws determining stepparent responsibility for child support
and other incidents of divorce and remarriage are much more specific
and detailed than in other states. An attorney advising clients would
need to research recently adopted legislation prescribing the apportion-
ment of basic and supplemental child support obligations between par-
ents2 and statutes regulating spouses' liability for each other's debts.3
But that would just be the beginning. California has also recently
adopted new legislation regarding premarital agreements. 4 Statutes di-
recting the courts' discretion in the division of community property, such
as the family home,' and those dealing with property exempt from en-
forcement of money judgments6 are also pertinent. Finally, an attorney
would need to review cases decided prior to the adoption of the new
legislation to determine their current force and analyze the few cases de-
cided under the new legislation. After all this study a lawyer might still
be unable to answer his or her client's questions with a high degree of
certainty, concluding either that the law has not clearly anticipated the
client's situation or has deliberately left the decision to the discretion of
trial courts.
This Article first describes the circumstances surrounding and the
causes underlying continuing child support disputes. Part III sets forth
the primary code sections which govern determination of child support
obligations where one of the parents has remarried, and those governing
the allocation of responsibility for the payments between the parent and
his or her new spouse.
Part IV discusses the determination of support awards under ex-
isting and prior law and recommends modifications to clarify and
strengthen the law. Part V analyzes stepparents' liability for child sup-
port during and following the stepparents' marriages. Part V also sug-
gests amendments to resolve inconsistencies in the statutes.
Finally, Part VI discusses current California law regarding the va-
2. Agnos Child Support Standards Act of 1984, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4720-4732 (West
Supp. 1988).
3. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5120.110, 5120.150, 5120.210, 5120.320 (West Supp. 1988).
4. Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5300-5317 (West Supp.
1988).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.7 (West 1987).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 695.020 (West Supp. 1988).
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lidity and effectiveness of premarital agreements concerning responsibil-
ity for support of either spouse's children and compares the situations of
spouses with and without premarital agreements to similarly situated
cohabitors.
II. CHILD SUPPORT DISPUTES: CIRCUMSTANCES AND CAUSES
Child support disputes between remarried parents typically revolve
around a request that child support payments be raised or lowered. The
argument is that remarriage, bringing with it additional income from the
new spouse, additional dependents, increased living expenses or a custo-
dial parent's return to full-time homemaking, has resulted in changed
circumstances,7 justifying a change in the award level.
There are two primary causes of continuing child support disputes
between remarried parents: (1) abysmally low levels of child support
awarded custodial parents at divorce; and (2) the parents' unrealistic de-
sire to recreate the traditional nuclear family in the second marriage.
Extremely low child support awards have been perpetuated by the
legal system and are only now being recognized as a significant factor in
child support disputes. Support awards to custodial parents at divorce-
usually mothers who earn substantially less than their children's father-
have historically been grossly inadequate. Awards have failed the test of
equity in three major respects. First, the typical award has been inade-
quate to rear children at a level above the poverty level.' Cost calcula-
tions have frequently omitted the cost of child care, resulting in awards
that are less than child care costs alone.9 Secondly, most awards are
structured so that the higher earning noncustodial parent can maintain
his10 pre-divorce standard of living while the custodial mother and chil-
7. Once made, support orders are modifiable only upon a showing of changed circum-
stances since the original order. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700(a) (West Supp. 1988).
8. L. WErZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 271-72 (1985); R. HASKINS, ESTIMATES
OF NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTIONS POTENTIAL AND THE INCOME SECURITY OF
FEMALE-HEADED FAMILIES, REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
BUSH INSTITUTE FOR CHILD AND FAMILY POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT
CHAPEL HILL (1985).
9. L. WETZMAN, supra note 8, at 271-72.
10. Male pronouns are used to describe noncustodial, obligor parents. Feminine pronouns
are used here and many places throughout this article for the custodial parent in order to
recognize and emphasize the demographic reality that most custodial parents are women, and
therefore, most noncustodial stepparents are also women. Federal Census data shows that in
1985, 90 percent of children in single parent homes were living with their mothers. A survey
of Los Angeles County Superior Court cases in 1985 showed that mothers had sole physical
custody in 85 percent of the cases, fathers had sole physical custody in 6 percent of the cases,
and the parents shared physical custody in 6 percent of the cases. SENATE TASK FORCE ON
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dren's standard of living plummets. 1 Finally, most orders have not equi-
tably apportioned the costs of rearing the children. The lower earning
custodial mother has been forced to devote a significantly higher percent-
age of her earnings to her children's needs than has their noncustodial
father. 2 In light of these findings, it is not difficult to understand how
custodial mothers see remarriage, either their ex-husband's or their own,
as an opportunity to improve their children's standard of living. Because
the noncustodial father is statistically likely to remarry a few years
sooner than the custodial mother, 13 it is his remarriage that creates the
first post-divorce support crisis.
The Agnos Act, enacted by the California state legislature to rem-
edy this situation, requires mandatory minimum support awards.14 Ade-
quate support awards, which means adequate to support the children at
the pre-divorce standard or, if that is impossible, adequate to support all
family members at the same standard of living, will reduce the custodial
mother's incentive to use the noncustodial father's remarriage to an em-
ployed woman as grounds to seek increased support. From the noncus-
todial father's perspective, having to pay realistic child support will
prevent him from deluding himself that he can also support his second
wife as a homemaker simply because his co-workers who are still in their
first marriages are able to support unemployed wives. Finally, from the
perspective of the future stepmother, knowing the amount of income her
suitor has left after paying adequate support will allow her to form more
realistic expectations of her standard of living if she marries a noncus-
todial father.
The second cause of continuing child support disputes is the unreal-
istic desire of each parent, particularly the custodial parent, to recreate
the traditional nuclear family in the second marriage. In the case of the
custodian's remarriage, this desire leads her or him to promote strong
affectional ties between the children and the new spouse. The new fam-
fly's group activities are emphasized, to the exclusion of the noncustodial
parent, often interfering with the other parent's scheduled time with the
children. In the case of the non-custodial parent's remarriage, this desire
FAMILY EQUITY, FINAL REPORT, June 1987, VII-1. The laws determining support liability
are gender-neutral.
11. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 274-75.
12. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 277-78.
13. VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1982, VOL. 3 "MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE," U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 1-34 (1986).
14. Agnos Child Support Standards Act of 1984, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4720-4732 (West
Supp. 1988).
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often appears in the expectation that the wife will be a full-time home-
maker, as was the case during the first marriage. The legal system cer-
tainly did not create the second cause, but neither has it done all it might
to cure it.
Just as the noncustodial parent's remarriage is likely to create the
first post-divorce support crisis, the custodial parent's remarriage is likely
to create the second. From a financial point of view, if a custodial
mother used her ex-husband's remarriage to gain a substantial increase in
support, she can expect turnabout to be considered fairplay. Even if she
did not seek an increase when her ex-husband remarried, or if she remar-
ried first, she may experience difficulty collecting support after her re-
marriage. Studies show that noncustodial fathers often feel justified in
decreasing support after the mother's remarriage.1" But even if the par-
ents avoid problems at the outset of either's remarriage, they may en-
counter them as a second marriage matures.
Professionals working with stepfamilies have observed custodial
mothers' attempts to, recreate nuclear families and have described the
problems it causes, while failing to appreciate its impact on child support
disputes.16 Although the studies of stepfamilies have focused on remar-
ried custodial mothers, there is no reason to assume that custodial fa-
thers, which include fathers with joint custody, will act differently than
custodial mothers. One author betrays an unarticulated bias in favor of a
new nuclear family of mother, stepfather, her children and possibly their
children.17 It is this unconscious equation of "family" with "household"
that perpetuates the denial of children's ties with noncustodial parents.
The pain caused by this denial frequently surfaces in the form of child
support disputes.
Other writers have discerned the problem of the disregarded non-
custodial parent, recognizing that the spouse of either parent is a steppar-
ent. Not all stepparents, however, welcome this relationship."8 Those
15. Tropf, An Exploratory Examination of the Effect of Remarriage on Child Support and
Personal Contacts, 7 J. OF DIVORCE 57, 64, 69 (1984); cf. Wallerstein & Corbin, Father-Child
Relationships After Divorce: Child Support and Education Opportunity, 20 FAM. L. Q. 109, 115
(1986), which found that fathers' child support diminished when the mothers' economic cir-
cumstances improved significantly, although decreases in support were not related directly to
either parent's marriage. Stepchildren in the father's new marriage and children born to the
new marriage significantly diminished child support to children of the first marriage.
16. Fast & Cain, The Stepparent Role: Potential for Disturbances in Family Functioning,
36 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 485, 488 (1966). Fast & Cain note this tendency to
reproduce the nuclear family and consider it doomed to failure.
17. L. DOBERMAN, THE RECONSTITUTED FAMILY 8 (1975).
18. E. VISHER AND J. VISHER, STEPFAMLIES: A GUIDE To WORKING WITH STEPPAR-
ENTS AND STEPCHILDREN xviii, 15-16 (1979).
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who have studied both stepfathers and stepmothers have found that step-
mothers have far less satisfactory relationships with their stepchildren
than stepfathers. 9 Stepchildrens' attitudes reflect their elders' feelings:
they report less affection for stepmothers than stepfathers.20 Dissatisfac-
tion with relationships can be expected to spill onto child support issues.
The custodial parent whose fantasy of a new nuclear family leads
him or her to act in a way that disrupts the children's relationship with
their other parent and stepparent needs to learn the connection between
such conduct and child support disputes. A parent whose visitation
plans must constantly take a backseat to the custodial family's outings,
who hears his children call her new husband "Daddy" while they call his
new wife by her first name, and who finds his children have started using
their stepfather's name at school will be sorely tempted to skip child sup-
port payments. This is especially true if he has children from his new
marriage2 or even stepchildren who look on him as "Daddy." A step-
parent who feels her stepchildren's mother is encouraging them to mis-
treat her is unlikely to object when her spouse misses child support
payments.
Generally speaking, lawyers are not adequately trained to recognize
the psychological stresses remarriage produces in their clients. They
have a tendency to diagnose the problems in terms of the legal issues
presented. Many family lawyers do make referrals to therapists when
they find that legal remedies do not satisfy their clients. Such- referrals
may come too late or be triggered as much by the lawyer's frustration in
dealing with a difficult client as by the recognition that unresolved ten-
sions over parenting roles and different definitions of "family" may be
preventing resolution of financial issues.
Lawyers who cannot make their clients see these destructive pat-
terns of behavior should refer them to family counselors. Many such
problems could be prevented by premarital mediation with lawyers and
therapists before the second marriage takes place.2 2 If that additional
expense seems beyond their clients' means, lawyers can refer them to the
Conciliation Court mediators.23 Although legislation currently limits the
jurisdiction of the Conciliation Court to custody and visitation dis-
19. Bowerman & Irish, Some Relationships of Stepchildren to Their Parents, in MARRIAGE
& FAMILY IN THE MODERN WORLD 580 (1969).
20. Id.
21. Wallerstein & Corbin, supra note 15.
22. Fisher & McFadden, Premarital and Remarital Mediation: Complementary Roles for
Lawyers and Therapists, 24 J. FAM. L. 451 (1985-86).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1988).
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putes,24 what looks at first glance like a child support dispute may actu-
ally be a parenting dispute in disguise. If necessary, the Conciliation
Court's jurisdiction should be expanded to include post-divorce child
support disputes.
III. GOVERNING STATUTES
Two recent legislative enactments deal with distinct but intertwined
aspects of the issue of stepparent responsibility for child support. The
Agnos Act addresses the issue of whose income can or should be consid-
ered in determining the amount of child support that a noncustodial par-
ent pays.2" The debt liability legislation controls whose income and
property is to be used, voluntarily or involuntarily, to meet child support
obligations.26 The debt liability statute explicitly recognizes that income
and property that is not legally liable for the support obligation may be
considered in determining the amount of that obligation. This position is
a logical result of the Agnos Act's linking the support obligation to a
parent's circumstances and station in life, but it precludes a simple an-
swer to the stepparent's question whether she or he is obliged to support
a spouse's child. While neither statute imposes personal liability for sup-
port obligations on a stepparent, both statutes clearly envision the possi-
bility of adverse economic consequences to the stepparent because of her
or his spouse's prior obligation.
A. 4gnos Child Support Standards Act
Reacting to well-documented findings that child support awards to
custodial parents were grossly inadequate and lacking in uniformity,
27
the legislature passed the Agnos Act, effective July 1, 1985.2" The Act's
principal purpose was to create fair and uniform standards for determin-
ing child support awards. In its findings and declaration of intent, the
legislature recognized that:
A parent's first and principal obligation is to support his or her
minor children according to the parent's circumstances and sta-
tion in life.... [A] parent's circumstances and station in life
are dependent upon a variety of factors, including his or her
24. Id.
25. Agnos Child Support Standards Act of 1984, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4720-4732 (West
Supp. 1988).
26. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5120.110, 5120.150, 5120.210, 5120.320(West Supp. 1988).
27. See generally L. WErrzMAN, supra note 8.
28. Agnos Child Support Standards Act of 1984, CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4720-4732 (West
Supp. 1988).
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earned and unearned income; earning capacity; assets; and the
income of his or her subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner, to
the extent that the obligated parent's basic living expenses are
met by the spouse or other person, thus increasing the parent's
disposable income and therefore his or her ability to pay more
than the mandatory minimum child support award established
by this chapter.29
The Act requires minimum support payments based on a percentage
of both parents' combined income.30 Its aim is to ensure that all children
receive support at least at the level provided by welfare benefits.31 Where
the parents' resources are sufficient, courts are urged to make supplemen-
tal support awards based on county guidelines. The courts are to follow
criteria set forth in "applicable statutes, relevant case law, and state and
local guidelines, so long as they are not in conflict with" the Act.32
In determining parents' ability to pay the minimum child support
award, courts are not to consider stepparents' earnings or separate prop-
erty income.33 They are directed to consider, however, the total number
of children each parent is legally obligated to support.3 4 The minimum
award is intended to cover basic living expenses, including food, shelter,
and clothing.35
If either parent requests it, the court is urged to make higher awards
to cover "[c]hild care expenses, special education expenses, expenses for
special medical, dental, or mental health needs, and expenses related to
any other special needs." 36 It is in determining the parent's ability to pay
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4720(e) (emphasis added). The Act's public policy pronouncement
that parents have a responsibility to support their minor children "according to the parent's
circumstances and station in life" is merely a codification of the American common law rule of
child support, which contrary to the older English rule, requires parents to provide their chil-
dren with more than the basic necessities of life. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES, COM-
MENTS, AND QUESTIONs 822-83, 887 (2d. ed. 1983); Bruch, Developing Standards for Child
Support Payments A Critique of Current Practice, 16 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 49, 49-51 (1982).
American courts have, at least in theory, asked the proper question in child support proceed-
ings: What amount of his income should this noncustodial parent be required to devote to his
children?
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4722 (West Supp. 1988).
31. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11452-11453 (West Supp. 1988); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4720(d) (West Supp. 1988).
32. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4720(d), 4724(a).
33. Id. § 4721(e). "It]he court shall not include any portion of the earned income and
income derived from the separate property of the current spouse or nonmarital partner of
either parent." Id.
34. Id. § 4721(f). "The court shall inquire of each party as to the total number of minor
children he or she is legally obligated to support." Id.
35. Id. § 4723.
36. Id.
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a supplemental award that the new spouse or non-marital partner's in-
come may be considered.37
Why the legislature decided to allow consideration of a stepparent's
resources only in determining supplemental awards is unclear. Prior to
the Agnos Act, child support statutes did not divide awards into
mandatory and discretionary components. One logical explanation is
that the legislature, which was striving to increase child support levels,
did not want to dilute parental responsibility by imposing on stepparents
a mandatory obligation to contribute to their stepchildren's basic needs.
At first glance, one might assume that imposing a mandatory obligation
would increase child support payments because more adults would be
legally obligated to support the child. In many cases, however, just the
opposite would result. Since most stepparents are also parents, their sup-
port payments would be divided among more children. Divorced fathers
are more likely to remarry than divorced mothers and to remarry sooner
than their ex-wives who do remarry.3" Remarried fathers are also more
likely to be supporting wives who are caring for children from prior mar-
riages. Allowing fathers to reduce their payments to their own children
because they must also support their stepchildren would lower the pay-
ments received by children whose mothers had yet to or would never
remarry.
Another possible explanation for the legislature's decision is judicial
efficiency. In many lower and lower-middle income families, remarriage
does not significantly improve a divorced parent's standard of living be-
cause the new spouse's net earnings are barely sufficient to cover his or
her own living expenses. This is equally true of the low-earning step-
mother and the moderate-earning stepfather who is paying reasonable
support to his own children. In such cases the noncustodial parent's en-
tire support obligation can be simply calculated by use of the mandatory
minimum formula.39 The resulting payment will probably be higher
than the pre-Agnos award. This will satisfy the custodial parent, who
will therefore not request a supplemental award. The court will not be
required to devote time to deciding the perplexing issue of whether a
stepparent's resources are reducing the parent's basic living expenses,
which is a threshold finding before the stepparent's resources may be
considered.
37. Id. § 4720(e).
38. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, NUMBER, TIMING AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND
DIVORCES IN THE UNITED STATES: JUNE 1975 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-
20 No. 297 (1976).
39. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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Whatever the reasons for the legislature's decision, exactly how a
court is to consider the stepparent's income, other than by resorting to
"applicable statutes, relevant case law, and state and local guidelines"'
is not specified. Are the courts, for example, to consider only the income
of the noncustodial parent's spouse? If one focuses on the language
"ability to pay more than the mandatory minimum child support
award,"41 it would seem that the legislature was focusing primarily on
the noncustodial parent and his new partner.42 But such a conclusion
would be premature. What the Agnos Act clearly does is remove any
doubt that courts may consider stepparents' income in determining sup-
plemental child support obligations.
B. Liability of Marital Property for Debts
Actually, as of January 1, 1985, six months before the effective date
of the Agnos Act, little doubt existed that courts could consider steppar-
ents' income, at least in some circumstances.43 Part of the new legisla-
tion clarifying the liability of community property for either spouse's
spousal and child support debts specifically disclaimed any intention to
limit courts' authority to consider any relevant factors, including step-
parents' earnings, in making support awards.'
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4724(a).
41. Id. § 4720(e).
42. One recent decision construed Section 4720(e) to refer only to the noncustodial par-
ent's spouse. In re Marriage of Bailey, 198 Cal. App. 3d 505, 509-10, 243 Cal. Rptr. 776, 779
(1988). The court's interpretation was not essential to the holding since only a mandatory
minimum award was at issue. The noncustodial mother argued that her ex-husband's current
wife's income should have been considered. The court of appeal should have answered that
claim solely by reference to Section 4721(e), which specifically excludes either parent's new
partner's income in calculating the mandatory minimum award.
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 199 (repealed 1985).
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.150(c). "[N]othing in this section limits the matters a court
may take into consideration in determining or modifying the amount of a support order, in-
cluding but not limited to, the earnings of the spouses of the parties." Id. (emphasis added).
The code sections defining stepparent liability for child support were based on a recommenda-
tion of the California Law Revision Commission. Recommendation Relating to Liability of
Stepparentfor Child Support, 17 CAL. L. REvisION COMM'N REP. 251, 256 (1984) [hereinafter
Recommendations]. After noting the confusing state of the law, the Commission stated:
The liability of the earnings of a stepparent for a child support obligation of the
parent should be dealt with clearly and directly. A child to whom the parent owes an
obligation of support should be in at least as good a position as a general creditor.
This means that in the case of remarriage of the parent, the child should be permitted
to enforce the support obligation not only against the separate property of the parent
but also against all community property of the subsequent marriage except the earn-
ings of the stepparent. To permit the child support obligation to be enforced against
the earnings of the stepparent is not only unfair to the stepparent but will also im-
pede remarriage of persons with child support obligations. The increased liability of
the community created by the remarriage of the parent is sufficient protection for the
[V/ol. 22:73
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The debt liability legislation is significant in several other respects.
First, it reversed prior case law classifying spousal and child support ob-
ligations as post-marital debts.4' A debt for support of a spouse or child
that does not arise out of the debtor's current marriage shall be treated as
a debt incurred before the marriage, regardless of whether the support
order was made or modified before or during the current marriage.'
The effect of this reclassification is to insulate the stepparent's earnings
from liability for the child support debt. The earnings of a married per-
son during marriage are not liable for a debt incurred by the person's
spouse before marriage.4 7
Second, the legislation clarified and extended the definition of "earn-
ings" that are protected from the other spouse's premarital creditors.
After payment, the earnings remain not liable as long as they are held in
a deposit account in which the debtor spouse has no right of withdrawal
and are uncommingled with other community property, except property
of insignificant amounts.48 This means that the stepparent can either
consume her earnings or bank them for future needs. Her future earn-
ings cannot be garnished to satisfy a judgment for her husband's unpaid
child support.49 Once she invests her community property earnings in
some other form of nonexempt property, however, these earnings can be
used to satisfy her spouse's premarital debts under the general rule that
allows premarital creditors to reach the separate property of the debtor
spouse and all nonexempt community property except the other spouse's
earnings.50
Third, the legislation created a right of reimbursement in the new
child. However, the earnings of the stepparent should be taken into account in set-
ting the amount of the child support obligation, in recognition of the fact that the
parent's ability to pay may be affected by the earnings of the stepparent.
Id. Prior to making its official recommendation, the Commission rejected an earlier recom-
mendation which stated:
In addition, because a support obligation deserves special treatment, the child or
former spouse should also be able to obtain a court order to reach the earnings of the
nonobligor spouse where there is no other property reasonably available to satisfy the
obligation and to do so appears equitable. This additional liability is consistent with
the rule that the earnings of the nonobligor spouse may be taken into account in
setting the amount of the support obligation.
Staff Draft No. D-312, Recommendation Relating to Liability of Marital Property for Debts
10 (Dec. 1, 1982). Such an argument is obviously bcotstrapping and was correctly
abandoned.
45. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.150(a) (West Supp. 1988).
47. Id. § 5120.110(b).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 5120.110(b) and 5120.150(a); Recommendations, supra note 44.
50. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.110(a) (West Supp. 1988).
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community if the debtor parent uses community property, including his
or her own earnings, to pay child support obligations at a time when his
or her nonexempt separate property income is available. 51 The measure
of reimbursement is the value of the property at the time the right
arises.52 The right must be exercised within three years of the time the
stepparent gains actual knowledge of the application of the property to
pay the debt or in proceedings for division of the community property at
dissolution or death of a spouse, whichever comes first.53 This means
that a parent must pay child support obligations first from the income of
his or her separate property, if any, in order to conserve the community
property for the benefit of the current marriage partners. If he or she
fails to do so, the stepparent may bring an action for reimbursement for
the benefit of the community.
The first two changes in the liability for debt statute clarify a step-
parent's rights when he or she is married to a noncustodial parent who is
under a support order. The final change, however, is applicable to all
stepparents, whether they are spouses of custodial or noncustodial par-
ents. The language "child support obligations"5 4 is equally applicable to
a noncustodial parent who sends a support check each month and a cus-
todial parent who pays her children's expenses. Thus a remarried custo-
dial parent who pays her children's bills from her community earnings
while banking her ex-husband's support checks may be in for a shock if
her second marriage ends in divorce. She may have chosen to save the
support payments towards the children's college expenses. She is not re-
quired to support her children past the age of nineteen or high school
graduation, whichever comes first.5 5 Many noncustodial parents fail to
contribute to their children's college education, despite promises made at
the time of the divorce.56 Relative to the second marriage, the checks
constitute a source of separate property income,57 which she is supposed
to use for the children's support. If her new husband has not waived his
reimbursement rights, she will be required to reimburse the dissolving
community up to the amount of separate property income.
Lawyers and judges interpreting both new statutes are faced with
the common question: whether the new statutes conflict with and there-
fore overrule prior case law or whether the statutes are not in direct con-
51. Id. § 5120.150(b).
52. Id. § 5120.210(b).
53. Id. § 5120.210(c).
54. Id. § 5120.150(b).
55. Id. § 196.5.
56. Wallerstein & Corbin, supra note 15, at 110-11.
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5107 (West 1983).
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flict with the cases and can be harmonized. This question is particularly
vexing in interpreting the Agnos Act. It specifically directs courts to
follow case law not in conflict with the Act in exercising discretion
whether to consider stepparent resources in setting supplemental awards.
To resolve cases under the new statutes, lawyers and judges must be fa-
miliar with repealed statutes. This will allow them to decide whether the
repealed statutes conflict with the current ones and therefore whether
cases decided pursuant to those statutes are still good law. It is therefore
necessary to examine the repealed statutes and prior case law.
C. Earlier Child Support Statutes
Before the adoption of the current statutes described above, steppar-
ent responsibility was even more uncertain than it is now. Civil Code
section 209,58 originally enacted in 1872, specifically provided that a
stepparent was not obligated to support his or her spouse's children un-
less the stepparent, having accepted the children into the family, acted in
loco parentis. This statute exempted all stepparents from personal liabil-
ity for child support except those who, because of a natural parent's
death or desertion, established a parent-child relationship.59 Civil Code
section 199, which became effective January 1, 1975, provided that the
obligation of a divorced father or mother to support his or her child from
a prior marriage could be satisfied only from the parent's earnings or
separate property.60 This statute marked the low point in protection for
children of remarried parents. It effectively insulated not only the step-
parent's earnings, but all community property acquired through either
spouse's efforts. In other words, it placed children seeking to enforce
child support orders in a weaker position than general creditors who had
sold goods or services to the noncustodial parent and who could reach
the accumulated community property.
Adding to the uncertainty, case law effectively classified child sup-
port obligations as post-marital debts because they became due periodi-
cally during the remarriage and were modifiable based on changed
58. CAL. CiV. CODE § 209 (repealed 1980). The community property interest of a natural
or adoptive parent in the income of his or her spouse shall be considered unconditionally
available for the care and support of any child who resides with the child's natural or adoptive
parent who is married to such spouse. The amount arising from such duty to care for and
support shall be reduced by the amount of any existing previously court ordered child support
obligations of such spouse.
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 209 (repealed 1980). See also Estate of Teddy, 214 Cal. App. 2d
113, 118, 29 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (1963).
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 199 (repealed 1985).
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circumstances during the remarriage. 1 Until 1975 all community prop-
erty of the new marriage was liable for the husband's post-marital debts;
since 1975 all community property has been liable for either spouse's
post-marital debts. 2
Neither section 209 nor 199 addressed the issue of consideration of a
stepparent's resources in determining child support awards. While sec-
tion 209 appeared neutral on the subject, section 199 reflected a view that
stepparent resources were not appropriate considerations in deciding
support awards. What pre-Agnos statutory support existed for consider-
ing stepparent resources was found in Civil Code section 4807, which
provides that community property, quasi-community property and sepa-
rate property may be subjected to the child support obligation. 3 But this
section, found in the title defining divorcing parents' property rights,"4
does not unambiguously refer to the community property of a later
marriage.
Such lack of explicit direction is hardly surprising considering that,
when the statutes were adopted, fewer divorced fathers had custody of
their children and fewer married women were in the work force. Thus,
fewer men sought child support from remarried ex-wives who were being
supported as homemakers by their current husbands and fewer women
sought increased child support based on their ex-husbands' new wives'
salaries. However, changes in custody patterns and, even more so,
changes in married women's work force participation in recent years
have substantially increased the number of cases where stepparent in-
come can be expected to figure in the child support calculation.
Stepparent resources first became a troublesome issue in the early
1970's as California attempted to comply with federal requirements for
state participation in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program" without substantially revising its law regarding step-
parent responsibility. Through much of its history, the federal AFDC
program took the position that in calculating eligibility for benefits, states
could consider the earnings of a custodial stepparent only where state
law imposed a general support obligation on all stepparents.6 6 State reg-
61. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 563, 432 P.2d 709, 712, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16
(1967); In re Marriage of Smaltz, 82 Cal. App. 3d 568, 570, 147 Cal. Rptr. 154, 155 (1978).
62. Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California's Community Prop-
erty System 1849-1975, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1, 64-65 (1976).
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4807 (West 1983).
64. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800-4813 (West 1983).
65. Social Security Act §§ 1, 401, 402, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 601, 602 (1982).
66. Coverage and Conditions of Eligibility in Financial Assistance Programs, 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.90(a) (1986).
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ulations for determining eligibility had to comply with federal AFDC
regulations.67 States had two choices: (1) they could enact laws making
all stepparents, whether custodial or noncustodial and whether or not the
custodial parent was a welfare recipient, personally liable to support their
stepchildren, at least during the existence of the marriage; or (2) they
could forego consideration of a custodial stepparent's income in deter-
mining eligibility for benefits.
Some states passed statutes imposing liability on all stepparents.68
However, the states which did not pass appropriate statutes were in a
bind. If the states persisted in considering the income of custodial step-
parents without proper state legislative authority, they risked the loss of
substantial federal benefits. Conversely, if the states failed to consider
custodial stepparent income, they were required to expend taxpayers'
funds to supplement benefits to a large number of families,6 9 many of
whom were not "needy" in the politically acceptable sense. 0
California attempted to extricate itself from this bind by creative use
of its community property laws. In 1971, at a time when California law
gave the husband management and control of all community property
except the wife's uncommingled earnings,71 the legislature adopted Civil
Code section 5127.5, which provided in relevant part:
The wife's interest in the community property, including the
earnings of her husband, is liable for the support of her children
to whom the duty of support is owed, provided that for the
purposes of this section, prior support liability of the husband
plus three hundred dollars ($300) gross monthly income shall
first be excluded in determining the wife's interest in the com-
munity property earnings of her husband.72
In Camp v. Swoap, welfare recipients successfully challenged regula-
tions implementing this section.73 The State of California argued that
section 5127.5 complied with federal guidelines because it afforded a ba-
sis for attributing a wife's community interest in her husband's earnings
67. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968); Camp v. Swoap, 94 Cal. App. 3d 733, 743,
156 Cal. Rptr. 600, 606 (1979).
68. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:2 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1
(1987).
69. Approximately 24,000 families were affected by the regulations adopted to implement
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5. Camp, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 737, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
70. Zumbrun, Momboisse & Findley, Welfare Reform: California Meets the Challenge, 4
PAC. L.J. 739, 778-79 (1973).
71. Prager, supra note 62, at 64-65.
72. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (repealed 1985).
73. 94 Cal. App. 3d 7&3, 747, 156 Cal. Rptr. 600, 609.
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to the support of her children by a prior relationship.74 The court re-
jected this argument, construing federal regulations to bar consideration
of the wife's community interest in her husband's earnings absent proof
that her husband actually made his earnings available to her to support
her children. 75 The state argued in vain that it was a relatively simple
matter for a stepfather/husband and his wife to arrange their bank,
credit accounts and other resources in such a way as to prevent a finding
that the stepfather's earnings were available to his wife for the support of
her children.76
The Camp decision failed to discuss the obvious point that the wife's
ownership interest in her husband's community earnings, especially in
his accumulated as opposed to prospective earnings, together with the
management rights afforded by section 5127.5, formed an independent
basis for considering the funds available to the children. Analytically, it
was the wife's property, not merely the husband's earnings, that was be-
ing considered in determining the children's eligibility. Had the appel-
late court considered the wife's ownership interest, it might very well
have concluded that, in the context of supporting her children, her com-
munity rights in her husband's earnings were illusory. She had no practi-
cal power to force him to make half his earnings available to her, such as
by deposit in a joint bank checking account.77 She had no practical
power to purchase goods and services on her husband's credit because
creditors routinely refused to extend credit to married women without
their husbands' signatures. 78 Doubtless section 5127.5 was intended to
provide her with such a power, but in the absence of the equal credit
legislation that was enacted a few years later, it was ineffective.79 While
she had the ostensible power to purchase necessities of life for herself and
the children of her current marriage on her husband's credit, this power
probably did not extend to her children by a prior relationship. 0
74. Id. at 741, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
75. Id. at 741-42, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
76. Id. at 746 n.6, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05 n.6. Under the terms of an injunction issued by
the trial court, welfare officials could have found that a stepfather's earnings were available for
the support of his wife's children if his earnings were placed in a joint bank account with her,
used to provide certain necessities for the stepchildren or subject to liability on a credit account
available for his wife's use. Id. at 737 n.4, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 602 n.4.
77. See newly enacted CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125.1 (West Supp. 1988), which first estab-
lished such a right as of July 1, 1987.
78. Prager, supra note 62, at 69 n.335.
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.30 (West 1985); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691-1691e; Federal Reserve System Regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (1987); cf. United States
v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 816 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987).
80. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5121, 5132 (West 1983).
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Shortly after the appellate court rendered section 5127.5 ineffective,
the legislature adopted Civil Code section 5127.6, which provided that a
custodial parent's community property interest in his or her spouse's
earnings would be considered unconditionally available for the support
of that parent's children.8' At the same time it adopted section 5127.6,
the legislature repealed Civil Code section 209.82 The in loco parentis
statute failed to meet federal guidelines as a general support obligation
law because it clearly did not apply to noncustodial stepparents and actu-
ally applied to only a small portion of custodial stepparents.
Once again, welfare recipients challenged state welfare department
regulations implementing the legislation. In Wood v. Woods,83 the court
of appeal was certain that the determinative legal support obligation it
had to focus on was that between the custodial stepparent and the
stepchild, rather than on any obligation between the spouses or between
the natural parent and his or her child.A While the court found the
statutory language difficult to interpret, it concluded that the language
imposed either an increased support obligation between parent and child
or between spouses, but did not impose a support obligation between
stepparents and unadopted stepchildren." Essentially, the court of ap-
peal decided that section 5127.6 had no impact on determining welfare
eligibility because it failed to impose a personal support obligation on
stepparents. Despite this failure, the new statute affected family law
cases by requiring consideration of the stepparent's income in child sup-
port disputes between remarried parents.
8 6
Ironically, the welfare recipients' victory was hollow. In a reversal
of long-standing policy, Congress adopted the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1981.87 The Act mandated state consideration of custo-
dial stepparents' income in determining eligibility for AFDC regardless
of any state support obligation. 8 Sections 5127.5 and 5127.6 remained
on the books in California, however, and their presence complicated de-
termination of child support obligations in non-welfare cases between re-
married parents, 9 despite judicial protests that attorneys routinely
81. See supra text accompanying note 58.
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 (repealed 1985).
83. 133 Cal. App. 3d 954, 184 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1982).
84. Id. at 963, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
85. Id. at 967, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
86. Id. (citing Reppy, Debt Collection from Married Californians: Problems Caused by
Transmutations, Single-Spouse Management, and Invalid Marriage, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
143, 204-06 (1981)).
87. Social Security Act § 402(a)(31), 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1982).
88. Id.
89. For criticism of former §§ 5127.5 and 5127.6, see Bruch, Management Powers and
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ignored the sections.90
How do the current statutes governing liability for support debts
and the determination of support awards differ from their predecessors?
First, Civil Code section 5120.150(a), which renders all community prop-
erty except the stepparent's uncommingled earnings liable for support
debts, clearly contradicts repealed Civil Code sections 199 and 5127.5.
Section 199 provided that only the parent's earnings and separate prop-
erty were liable. Section 5127.5 stated that the wife's half-interest in her
husband's community earnings was liable, impliedly exempting the step-
parent's half of the community property. Thus, in enforcement disputes,
the principle issue in the future will be characterizing property of the
remarried parent and the stepparent, particularly property purchased
with community earnings and titled in some other form, such as joint
tenancy.
Just as clearly, Civil Code section 5120.150(a) reinstates the rule of
repealed section 209 that stepparents are generally not personally liable
to support their stepchildren. Section 209 was repealed in an effort to
comply with federal welfare statutes, but its repeal did not reflect a deter-
mination that stepparents' separate property should be liable for their
stepchildren's support.
But the result is less clear on the issue of determining support
awards because such decisions are consigned to the court's discretion.
Civil Code section 4700 is essentially consistent with the Agnos Act in
directing that awards be set according to the parent's standard of living
and allowing consideration of whatever resources contribute to that stan-
dard. Repealed section 5127.6, which mandated consideration of the
parent's half-interest in the new spouse's community earnings, clearly
conflicts with the Agnos Act. In determining whether the new spouse's
earnings should be counted, the Act considers whether those earnings
reduce the parent's living expenses to be the crucial factor. Section
5127.6 counted earnings regardless of whether they reduced the parent's
expenses.
Duties Under California's Community Property Laws: Recommendations for Reform, 34 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 227, 256-60 (1982).
90. Gorenfeld, Department 'J" Sponsors Essay Contest on How to Calculate Child Support
When Custodial and/or Noncustodial Parent Remarries and Acquires Step-Children, 1981 BAR-
RISTERS BULLETIN 6; Gorenfeld, Calculations of Child Support When Parents Remarry,
DAILY J. REP. No. 82-9 at 3 (May 7, 1982).
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IV. DETERMINATION OF SUPPORT AWARDS
A. Consideration of Current Spouse's Resources Before Agnos
1. Impact of community earnings
Before their repeal in 1984, Civil Code sections 5127.5 and 5127.6
were construed in three appellate cases involving the support obligations
of remarried parents. The courts' decisions were not based solely on the
repealed statutes. Therefore, the question remains whether these prior
cases are inconsistent with the Agnos Act and have been overruled or
whether they are not inconsistent and can serve as useful guides to inter-
preting the new statute.
In re Marriage of Brown91 and In re Marriage of Havens92 both in-
volve a custodial father's attempt to secure child support contributions
from his homemaker or low-earning ex-wife following the wife's remar-
riage. In both cases, the father apparently sought a court order based on
his ex-wife's new husband's community earnings. Brown came before the
court on an appeal from an order quashing a subpoena for the stepfa-
ther's income tax returns.93 Havens came before the court on the father's
appeal from the denial of his motion for increased support.94 In both
cases, the trial courts apparently refused to count the stepfather's earn-
ings in setting the amount the mother was to pay. The decisions made in
the cases, however, reveal the analytical difficulty in distinguishing the
issues of whose resources are to be considered in setting support levels
from what resources are legally liable for such debts.
In each case, the father's argument essentially was that since section
91. 99 Cal. App. 3d 702, 160 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1979). Mrs. Brown was married first to Gary
Brown and later to Paul Brown. Sometime after her divorce from Gary, he obtained custody
of their three children and sought child support from his ex-wife, who by then had married
Paul. Id. at 704-05, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 525. Mrs. Brown was either a homemaker or earned
relatively little money, because Gary felt the need to bolster his case by seeking to depose Paul
and examine his post-marriage tax returns. Id. See also Note, Domestic Relations - Stepparent
is Liable for Support of Spouse's Children From Prior Marriage but Tax Returns Are Not Dis-
coverable in Determining Extent of Liability - In re Marriage of Brown, 21 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 865 (1981).
92. 125 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 178 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1981). Sometime after the divorce, cus-
tody of one of the two children was transferred from mother to father. The father's support
obligation was reduced by one-quarter at a time when he earned more than four times his ex-
wife's income. Shortly thereafter, each of the Havens remarried and the father moved to mod-
ify the child support award. Id. at 1012, 1013-14, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. The court noted
that each new community had approximately the same income but did not mention whether
either new spouse had any additional child support obligations. Id. at 1014, 178 Cal. Rptr. at
477.
93. Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 704, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
94. Havens, 125 Cal. App. 3d at 1012, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
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5127.5 rendered the wife's half of the community property of the new
marriage liable for her child support obligations, that amount should be
considered in determining her ability to pay. Both appellate courts ac-
cepted the argument and affirmed that section 5127.5 intended that all
property of the wife, including her community interest in the income of
her new husband, be available to discharge her support obligation. 95
Although the courts used the language of debt liability,96 they were actu-
ally deciding the issue of resource availability and allocation in determin-
ing awards. The implication of Havens is that failure to consider
resources within a parent's control that are liable for the debt is revers-
ible error.
Brown specifically rejected the stepfather's contention that Civil
Code section 19997 insulated his earnings from consideration.9" Section
199 provided that the obligation of a divorced father or mother to sup-
port his or her child could be satisfied only from the parent's earnings
and separate property. Faced with a direct conflict between sections 199
and 5127.5, the court effectively interpreted section 199 out of the Code
by emphasizing language limiting it to child support actions "under this
chapter."99 Henceforth, child support actions needed only to be based
on a different code section, such as Civil Code section 4700,100 to negate
whatever protection the legislature had intended to give stepparents'
earnings under section 199.101
Did the court really need to interpret section 199 into oblivion? The
issue before the court was whether the noncustodial stepfather's commu-
nity earnings could be considered in determining his wife's child support
payments. The stepfather essentially argued that since his earnings were
not liable for the payments, it was improper to consider them. The court
could have refuted his argument by pointing out that he was confusing
the issues of availability and liability. Additionally, the court could have
said that no statutory limit existed on what resources a trial court could
95. Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 705-07, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 525-26; Havens, 125 Cal. App. 3d
at 1015, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
96. Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 525; Havens, 125 Cal. App. 3d at
1015, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 199 (repealed 1985).
98. Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 706-07, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
99. Id.
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700 (West Supp. 1988).
101. Section 199's impact had already been considerably blunted by an Attorney General's
Opinion holding that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated against legitimate children
by limiting their sources of support to their parent's earnings and separate property while
imposing no similarrestriction on the sources of support for nonmarital children. 59 Op. Att'y
Gen. 15 (Cal. 1976).
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consider, even though section 199 placed a limit on what resources could
be taken involuntarily to pay the debt. Under such a rule the trial court
could consider the homemaker's community interest in setting an award.
Just when it seemed clear that half the community property should
be considered in setting child support awards, the Havens court muddied
the waters by stating, without further explanation, that "in apportioning
the amount of support, the court shall take into consideration the respec-
tive earnings or earning capacities of the parents as required by Civil
Code section 196. " 12 Whether the court meant that one parent could be
required to pay more child support because his earnings were higher,
even though the new couples' community incomes were similar, re-
mained uncertain.
Brown and Havens are interesting for what authorities they do not
cite in assessing remarried parents' child support obligations. Neither
case cited Weinberg v. Weinberg,"'3 in which the California Supreme
Court had held several years earlier that child support obligations were
post-marital debts for which the entire community property of the obli-
gor-husband's new marriage was liable. The community's liability was
based on the husband's management of the entire community property
except his wife's uncommingled earnings." 4 The manner in which the
courts would have treated the child support obligation of a non-earning
wife without separate property prior to the 1975 equal management legis-
lation is uncertain,105 but that problem need not have troubled the Brown
court. Both Brown and Havens arose after 1975, yet neither court cited
the equal management legislation, Civil Code section 5125,106 which be-
came effective January 1, 1975. That section accorded husbands and
wives equal management rights, with few exceptions, regardless of which
spouse had earned the community property. Combined with Weinberg,
102. Havens, 125 Cal. App. 3d at 1015, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
103. 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13.
104. ML at 563-64, 432 P.2d at 712, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
105. See Reppy, supra note 79. The courts could have relied on Civil Code section 196,
which authorizes basing child support awards on "earnings or earning capacity." CAL. Civ.
CODE § 196 (West 1982). The noncustodial mother would then have been faced with the
choice of obtaining employment or asking her new husband to pay her obligation from funds
under his management.
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1988). Prior to the enactment of the equal man-
agement legislation, merely classifying the obligation as the wife's post-marital debt would
have been insufficient to expose the community property, which was under the husband's man-
agement. During this period the wife's tort or contract creditors were often unsuccessful in
arguing that the wife had acted as the husband's agent, thereby rendering the community
property liable. See generally W. RPPPY & W. DEFuNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE
UNrrED STATES 370-71 (1975). But the wife hardly could have acted as the second husband's
agent in incurring support liability for the children of her prior marriage..
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section 5125 would have provided persuasive authority that the entire
community property of the wife's new marriage, not merely the one-half
interest referred-to in sections 5127.5 and 5127.6, should be considered in
determining her child support obligation. One may plausibly argue that
property not liable for the debt should be considered in determining the
amount, because the property is contributed to the parent's support and
reduces the amount of income the parent must spend on his or her needs.
To assert, however, that property liable for the debt should not be con-
sidered in determining the amount is not a plausible argument.
In re Marriage of Escamilla10 7 focused on other parts of sections
5127.5 and 5127.6, specifically those provisions dealing with the noncus-
todial father's support obligation. The trial court had granted the
mother exclusive occupancy of the family home, partly as her share of
the community property division and partly in lieu of child support,
which the four minor children's father was currently unable to pay. The
decree also provided that the home be sold and the father given his share
of the proceeds six months after the mother's remarriage. 10  The mother
objected to this last condition, arguing that it had no relation to the chil-
dren's need for support. The court of appeal agreed and reversed the
trial court's decision.109 The noncustodial father attempted to rely on
sections 5127.5 and 5127.6, claiming that upon hpr remarriage, his ex-
wife's community interest in her new husband's earnings would be avail-
able for the children's support and his proportionate share would thus be
less. Language in each section led the court to reject the father's argu-
ments. Section 5127.5 provided that it did not lessen the noncustodial
father's support obligations"1 and section 5127.6 specifically stated that
any support provided by a custodial stepparent would not affect a non-
custodial parent's support obligation."1 Thus, Escamilla stood for the
proposition that the custodial parent's remarriage, and consequent com-
munity benefits, did not reduce the noncustodial parent's obligation to
support his children according to his means.
Each of the three cases provided valuable guidance on an important
point. Brown authorized trial courts to consider a noncustodial steppar-
107. 127 Cal. App. 3d 963, 179 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1982).
108. Id. at 967-68, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
109. Id. at 971, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (repealed 1985) ("A natural father is not relieved of any
legal obligation to support his children by the liability imposed by this section. . . .") Id.
111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 (repealed 1985) ("[A]ny contribution for care and support
provided by a spouse who is not a natural or adoptive parent of the child shall not be consid-
ered a change in circumstances that would affect a court ordered support obligation of a natu-
ral or adoptive parent of that child.") Id.
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ent's community earnings in determining child support awards, at least
where the stepparent's earnings were greater than the parent's.
112
Havens maintained that child support could be determined by the par-
ent's earning capacity, although without explaining how that principle
should be harmonized with the principle of equal community property
ownership. 113 Finally, Escamilla established the welfare sections as
swords, but not shields, in enforcing child support obligations: the com-
munity property principle of equal ownership could be invoked to in-
crease a child support award where the noncustodial parent had little or
no earnings, but could not be used to reduce a child support award below
what the noncustodial parent would otherwise pay.114
Although the policy these cases represent may not have been clearly
articulated, it is essentially sound and is consistent with the current stat-
utes. Children, whose standard of living undoubtedly dropped as a result
of their parents' divorce, might benefit from a parent's remarriage, but
they were not to suffer further economic deprivation because of remar-
riage. For example, if their noncustodial mother remarried and became a
homemaker, her community interest in her new husband's earnings
could be considered in determining her support obligation. The opposite
result would have forced the court to do one of two things. The court
could have determined support on the basis of the mother's separate
property, which in most cases would have yielded a meager order. Alter-
natively, the court could have based the award on her earning capacity,
which would have embroiled the court in issues such as whether she had
quit her job to escape her support obligation and whether the presence of
children in the new marriage excused her from outside employment.
But, if the children's noncustodial father married a homemaker, the
court could look at his earning capacity, rather than simply his half in-
terest in the community property, and maintain his support obligation
undiminished. A contrary result would have served to further widen the
gap between the standards of living in an unremarried mother's and a
remarried father's homes. Finally, if their custodial mother remarried,
their noncustodial father could not use her community interest in her
new husband's earnings to reduce his monthly obligation. This result not
only reaffirmed the principle that every parent must support his children
according to his ability, but in many cases it probably gave the custodial
112. In re Marriage of Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d 702, 706-07, 160 Cal. Rptr. 524, 526 (1979).
113. In re Marriage of Havens, 125 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1015, 178 Cal. Rptr. 477, 479
(1981).
114. In re Marriage of Escamilla, 127 Cal. App. 3d 963, 970, 179 Cal. Rptr. 842, 846
(1982).
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mother the option of leaving the work force to spend more time raising
her children.
But these cases,'viable as they are, are all based on the assumption
that a married person's earnings are community property. California,
however, has always recognized the right of married persons to contract
out of the community property system and retain their earnings as their
separate property. The cases discussed next consider the issue of
whether a stepparent's separate property should be considered in deter-
mining support awards.
2. Impact of separate property
In In re Marriage of Shupe,' the court of appeal considered the
application of section 5127.6 to a case involving affluent couples; one of
these couples had exercised their right to opt out of the community prop-
erty system by agreeing that each spouse's earnings were that spouse's
separate property. The custodial mother sought an increase in child sup-
port seven years after the divorce and after each parent had remarried.
Both parents' incomes had increased substantially since their divorce, but
the father earned more than the mother. When the father sought to in-
troduce evidence of the stepfather's income, the mother objected on the
ground that their separate property agreement made her husband's in-
come irrelevant.' 
16
The father claimed that the words "unconditionally available" in
section 5127.6 meant that all money that would have been community
property but for a separate property agreement must be considered in
determining child support obligations. The court of appeal examined the
section's legislative history and subsequent judicial treatment. The court
concluded that the provision was intended to apply to welfare recipients,
but that this was not stated clearly because a clear statement would have
violated federal regulations, thus rendering the statute ineffective in re-
ducing the state's welfare rolls.1 7 Both parents, the court noted, had an
equal duty to support their children. All of the parents' assets, including
the community income of their subsequent spouses, were to be consid-
ered in determining child support obligations." 8 The court therefore in-
terpreted the statute to apply only to determinations of welfare eligibility
115. 139 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 189 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983).
116. Id. at 1031, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
117. Id. at 1033, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92. In responding to the mother's equal protection
challenge, the court found that § 5127.6 would unconstitutionally discriminate against custo-
dial parents if the statute conclusively presumed that they, but not their ex-spouses, had a
community interest in their new spouses' incomes. Id. at 1034-35, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.
118. Ird.
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and not to apportioning support obligations between parents.1 19 The
court concluded that the trial court had not erred in disregarding the
stepfather's separate income and granting the mother a small increase
based on the father's increased income.
In its pragmatic analysis of section 5127.6, the court of appeal failed
to consider another portion of the section that it could have relied on to
affirm the trial court's decision. The court's emphasis on the proper in-
terpretation of section 5127.6 also concealed the inconsistency between
its holding and the holdings in two earlier cases discussed below which
considered a second wife's and a female cohabitor's separate property in
modifying the ex-husband's and male cohabitor's support obligations.
The simplest route to affirming the Shupe trial court's modest in-
crease in child support would have been that taken the prior year in In re
Marriage of Escamilla. 120 In Escamilla, the appellate court relied on that
portion of section 5127.6 which provided that a stepparent's contribution
to his stepchild's support could not be considered a change in circum-
stances that would affect the court ordered support obligation of the non-
custodial parent.1 21 The father had been paying a little more than ten
percent of his net monthly income as child support. The trial court in-
creased the amount to almost sixteen percent, which was still below some
courts' published guidelines.I22 Therefore, whether the stepfather's earn-
ings were community or separate property was irrelevant. According to
section 5127.6, the very statute on which the father relied, the stepfa-
ther's contributions could not be used to reduce his own obligation. As
the Shupe court indeed noted, a "[h]usband cannot avoid his duty to
contribute a reasonable amount to the support of his child on grounds
that the child's mother could provide for their child's entire support if
provided with no alternative." '23 No parent can argue, absent hardship
situations, that the other parent's greater resources allows him or her to
provide for all of the child's needs. Because the child is entitled to be
supported according to both parents' abilities, the greater their combined
resources, the greater the child's "needs." 2 '
The practical result of Shupe appeared to be that premarital agree-
ments making earnings separate property would insulate a stepparent's
119. Id. at 1035, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
120. In re Marriage of Escamilla, 127 Cal. App. 3d 963, 179 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1982).
121. Id. at 970-71, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47.
122. See generally Norton, Explaining and Comparing the California Child Support Sched-
ules, 4 CAL. FAM. L. MONTHLY 1, 7-8 (1987).
123. Shupe, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 1036, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 294; cf. Mattos v. Correia, 274 Cal.
App. 2d 413, 421-22, 79 Cal. Rptr. 229, 235 (1969).
124. C. MARKEY, CALIFORNIA FAMILY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2023.10 (1985).
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income from consideration in determining the amount of child support
awards as well as insulate stepparent's income from liability for child
support awards. 125 Such a result could lead to far lower support awards
where a noncustodial parent with no or low earnings is being comforta-
bly supported by a spouse's separate property earnings. However, reli-
ance on Shupe might have exposed contracting spouses to risks because
the result in Shupe apparently contradicted the results in two prior deci-
sions by the court of appeal, Gammell v. Gammel 126 and Fuller v.
Fuller.
127
Neither Gammell nor Fuller was discussed in Shupe. The Gammell
court held that separate property of. a second wife could be considered in
denying a husband's motion to reduce spousal support to his first wife
after his own income had been reduced by his retirement. 128 In Fuller,
the court held that a cohabitor's earnings, which were pooled with the
noncustodial father's and reduced the father's living expenses, could be
considered in denying the father's motion to reduce child support after
he became disabled and ceased work.129 In justifying their decisions,
both courts focused on the availability of the new partner's income to the
new household and its use in reducing the payor's living expenses. In
deciding the spousal support issue, the Gammell court did not seem in-
fluenced by the fact that the second wife's income was "true" separate
property derived from a family trust, rather than earnings made separate
by agreement. The court stated, "as a pragmatic matter this income di-
rectly or indirectly reduces the needs of the husband and it directly or
indirectly affects the husband's ability to meet the needs of his former
wife." 1 0 The court noted, however, that it was not considering the
rights of the parties where a second wife did not contribute the income
from her separate property to the common expenses of the second
125. Separate property agreements are generally effective in insulating the stepparent's
earnings from liability for child support obligations because, under general community prop-
erty principles, one spouse's separate property is not liable for the other spouse's debt. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 5120.130 (West Supp. 1988). See infra, discussion in text accompanying notes
286-301 for a possible exception.
For whatever other reasons they may have made their separate property agreement, the
former Mrs. Shupe and her new husband were probably aware that it protected their earnings
from liability for their stepchildren's support. Currently, Civil Code § 5120.110 provides such
protection for stepparent's earnings without sacrificing the benefits of the community property
system. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.110 (West Supp. 1988).
126. 90 Cal. App. 3d 90, 153 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1979).
127. 89 Cal. App. 3d 405, 152 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1979).
128. Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 93, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
129. Fuller, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 405, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
130. Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 93, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
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marriage.13
The Fuller decision went even further in stressing the court's power
to consider the availability of funds not legally liable for the obligation in
determining the amount of that obligation. The father lived with a wo-
man and her child by a previous marriage. In sidestepping the father's
contention that his cohabitor had no duty to support his children, the
court said that such a lack of duty did not mean that it is improper to
consider a cohabitor's income when that income was being used to re-
duce the parent's expenses.1 32 The appellate court even countenanced
the trial court's rejection of evidence of the cohabitor's expenses, presum-
ably for her child, stating "[ilt is irrelevant what expenses [she] may
have. What is relevant is what expenses Mr. Fuller has which are being
effectively reduced by the particular living circumstances of this case."
133
Do the holdings in Gammell and Fuller truly contradict the holding
in Shupe? If so, which represents the better view? More importantly,
which, if either, represents the view of the current statutes? One differ-
ence between Shupe and Gammell/Fuller is that the separate property
being considered in Shupe was that of the recipient's spouse, rather than
that of the payor's spouse. That seems too fine a distinction to explain
the result, especially in light of Shupe's conclusion that no rational basis
exists for distinguishing between custodial and noncustodial parents for
the purpose of presuming the availability of additional assets for their
child's support.
134
Mr. Shupe would have had a stronger legal position had he relied on
a reverse Gammell/Fuller argument, namely that his ex-wife's ability to
share expenses with her new husband reduced her own living expenses,
leaving her more disposable income to contribute to their son's needs.
135
131. IaH at 94, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72.
132. Fuller, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 410, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
133. Ia at 411, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
134. Shupe, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 1034, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 292. An explanation of the results,
if not a reconciliation of the analyses, may lie in the courts' perceptions of the equities. The
Gammell court was obviously more sympathetic to the ex-wife, divorced after 31 years of
marriage and still working part-time at age 69, than it was to her retired ex-husband who had
married a woman with a trust fund. Where the second wife's income nearly made up the
decrease in income the husband experienced on retirement, the court refused to grant a reduc-
tion, even while noting "we do not here decide whether such income may be relied on for an
increase.. . ." Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 94, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 171. Similarly, the Fuller
trial court expressed the view that the support payments it refused to reduce after the father's
disability retirement were "super low." Fuller, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 412, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
135. This argument would probably have failed in his particular case because the numbers
were against him. His ex-wife would probably have been able to demonstrate that she was
contributing more to their son's support than he was, whether measured by cash or as a pro-
portion of her income, even disregarding the value of her caretaking services.
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The appellate court's consideration of such an argument might have pre-
vented the conflict between the Gammell/Fuller position that the char-
acter of the new partner's property is irrelevant if it reduces the obligor's
expenses and the Shupe position that a new partner's separate property
earnings may be disregarded in apportioning support obligations between
the parents. The Shupe decision is unfortunate for another reason: the
former Mrs. Shupe won her child support battle, but at a very high cost.
She prevailed because she had agreed to forego any community property
rights in the accumulations of her spouse, who probably earned more
than she did.
Another distinction is that in Shupe the father asked the court to
consider the stepfather's earnings as part of his defense against his ex-
wife's request for increased payments, whereas in Gammell and Fuller
the former husbands asked the courts to disregard their current mates'
incomes in granting them reductions in their support payments. 3 6 The
cases can be reconciled by focusing on the obligor's standard of living.
When the obligor requests a reduction in support payments, he must
demonstrate a decline in his standard of living, not merely a decline in
his income. According to this principle, where the obligor's standard of
living has risen since the last increase in support payments, the custodial
stepparent's income, whether it is community or separate property, is
irrelevant. Similarly, where the obligor's income has dropped, but his
standard of living has not declined because of contributions from a new
mate, those contributions, whether community or separate, should be
considered. Shupe "reached the right result for the wrong reasons. Be-
cause it relied on statutes now repealed that are inconsistent with the
current statute, it can be disregarded. The analyses in Gammell and
Fuller are consistent with support principles found in both the former
and the current legislation and the cases are therefore still good law,
although their holdings are narrower than a later appellate decision
assumed. 137
In considering whether Gammell and Fuller support the broader
contention that a stepparent's community earnings should be considered
in determining whether to grant increased child support, it should be
noted that neither case involved a couple entitled to claim the benefits of
the community property system. Neither case relied, therefore, on the
subsequently repealed sections 5127.5 or 5127.6. In Gammell, the hus-
band had retired and his income, which apparently was from a pension
136. Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 92-93, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 171; Fuller, 89 Cal. App. 3d at
408-09, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
137. See In re Marriage of Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d 263, 231 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1986).
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or investments, was presumptively separate property, 138 as was the in-
come from his wife's trust fund. In Fuller, the couple was not married
and did not assert an agreement to pool earnings and share
accumulations.
Neither court cited any direct authority for its holdings' that a new
partner's income could be considered in determining the amount of the
support obligation.139 The holdings seemed logical: since two can live
more cheaply together than separately, the new partner's income would
provide the obligor with a net savings if the couple maintained their
premarriage standard of living because her income would exceed the in-
creased expenses of her joining her husband's (or cohabitor's) household.
Probably because neither couple was entitled to the benefits of the com-
munity property system and because both cases were appeals from deni-
als of motions to reduce support, the courts did not weigh the new
couple's community right to benefit from their joint efforts against the
former spouse's and children's right to support. Such a balancing would
have to wait for a case involving a remarriage with both spouses contrib-
uting community earnings.
3. Duty to work to support, stepchildren
In In re Marriage of Williams," the court of appeal drew the line,
however, at imposing an affirmative obligation on a stepmother to work
in order to increase the amount of child support her husband could pay
for the children of his former marriage. Williams involved a working
custodial mother's request for increased child support from her remar-
ried former husband. She sought to double a three year old order for the
support of her two daughters primarily on the basis of her ex-husband's
increased community income. He had married a woman whose earnings
were nearly equal to his own. 4' But before his ex-wife's motion was
138. Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71. The husband alleged that
retirement had reduced his income by $18,601 per year and that he owned property worth
$117,093. Income from separate property is separate property. George v. Ransom, 15 Cal.
322 (1860); see also CAL. Cv. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1983).
139. The most pertinent precedent was cited in Gammell, where the court noted that
"[s]ince a remarriage with its additional burdens is a factor to be considered in modifying
support payments, it appears fair and equitable that a remarriage with its additional benefits
also ought to be considered." Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 93, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 171. It is
highly doubtful that a former husband who married an unemployed wife today could use that
argument to reduce either spousal or child support payments. Witness the denial of Mr. Wil-
liams' motion to reduce child support. In re Marriage of Williams, 155 Cal. App. 3d 57, 63,
202 Cal. Rptr. 10, 14 (1984).
140. 155 Cal. App. 3d 57, 202 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1984).
141. Id. at 59, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
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heard, the father and his new wife quit their jobs and moved out of state
to escape the high cost of living in the Los Angeles area. The father
found work at a lower salary but his wife, then pregnant, was not seeking
employment at the time of the hearing. 42
The trial court granted the mother a modest increase, presumably
based on her ex-husband's income from the sale of real estate in Califor-
nia and his decreased living expenses.' 43 The mother appealed, claiming
the court had abused its discretion in basing the award on the father's
and stepmother's actual income instead of their earning capacities. In
affirming the trial court, the appellate panel applied different standards
for evaluating the noncustodial parent's and the stepparent's duties. It
found that it had been well established that a child support award may be
assessed against a parent based on earning capacity rather than actual
earnings only where some conduct indicates a deliberate intent to avoid
financial responsibilities." However, while a stepparent's earnings
should be considered as available to reduce the paying spouse's expenses,
the panel noted that a stepparent's earning capacity, as opposed to actual
earnings, has never been considered the appropriate standard for deter-
mining the obligor spouse's ability to pay.' 4- The court refused to im-
pose a duty to work for the benefit of her stepchildren on a stepmother
who had quit work to have a child of her own.'
46
The court cited no authority for its position that a stepparent has no
duty to work to support noncustodial stepchildren. The burden of proof
was on the custodial mother as appellant to prove abuse of discretion.
Her claim was a bold one, tantamount to claiming that all stepparents
have a personal obligation to support their stepchildren. Former Civil
Code section 199, repealed as of January 1, 1985, would have furnished
some support for the court's position."4 It provided that the child sup-
port obligation of the divorced parent shall extend only to, and be satis-
fied only from, the parent's total earnings and separate property. But the
strongest support for the court's position is the long common-law tradi-
tion that noncustodial stepparents have no obligation toward their
stepchildren.' The appellate decisions in Wood v. Woods 49 and In re
142. Id at 60, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
143. What the court apparently failed to consider was whether, because of the father's out-
of-state move, he would be spending substantially less time with his children and their mother,
therefore, would be responsible for a larger share of their expenses and care.
144. Williams, 155 Cal. App. 3d at 62, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
145. d at 64, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 15..
146. Id.
147. CAL. CIV. CODE § 199 (repealed 1985).
148. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 41.
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Marriage of Shupe 150 confirmed that the legislature was not willing to
impose a general support obligation on all stepparents, even when that
offered a guaranteed reduction in California's welfare expenditures. 151
A review of the cases discussed above demonstrates that the posi-
tion taken in the Agnos Act, and affirmed by the debt liability legisla-
tion, that stepparent income can be considered in determining child
support obligations, is rooted in case law. The unresolved issue is
whether the statutes intended to broaden the holdings of such cases, par-
ticularly Gammell. The Gammell court was careful to limit its holdings
to the facts of the case. It noted that it was not deciding the fights of the
parties where the current spouse did not contribute her income to the
new household nor was it deciding whether the current spouse's income
could be considered in granting an increase. 52 The complication in ana-
lyzing the Agnos Act in light of Gammell is the difference in the stan-
dards for spousal and child support. Gammell was a spousal support
case. The spousal support obligation is capped by the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage. 53 Thus, a former wife who through her
own earnings and her current support payments is able to maintain her-
self at that level has no claim for increased payments based either on
increases in her former husband's post-divorce earnings or his new wife's
income. That either has raised his standard of living above that of the
prior marriage is irrelevant. In contrast, children are entitled to share in
their parents' increased standard of living. Their claim that stepparent
resources are a proper basis for granting them increased support cannot
be easily dismissed. This brings the argument around to the relevance of
the stepparent's decision to segregate some or all of his or her earnings
rather than contributing them to the household budget. If a stepparent
does so, the income is not raising the parent's standard of living or, in the
terms of the Agnos Act, not meeting the parent's basic living expenses,
therefore, neither increasing his disposable income nor increasing his
ability to pay.
B. Post-Agnos Cases
1. Impact of obligor-spouse's new community income
Whether the new legislation apportioning child support responsibil-
149. 133 Cal. App. 3d 954, 184 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1982).
150. 139 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 189 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983).
151. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
152. Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 94, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72.
153. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
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ity between parents154 or that allocating liability for debts between
spouses 5-5 will substantially change the standards for determining child
support between remarried parents will not be known for some time, but
two cases decided after the new statutes' passage offer some guidance.
The first, In re Marriage of Ramer,15 6 concerned a rare appellate reversal
of a trial judge's decision modifying spousal support owed by a remarried
ex-husband. The trial judge's apparent failure to consider the new wife's
community earnings was partially responsible for the reversal. In the
second case, In re Marriage of Nolte, 157 the court held that the trial court
properly refused to consider the custodial stepfather's earnings in deter-
mining the minimum child support award under the Agnos Act.
Ramer represented the appellate court's first opportunity to bal-
ance the support needs of a former spouse and her child against the enti-
tlements of the new community to which both spouses contributed
substantial income. The published opinion in Ramer concerned the for-
mer wife's second appeal following a retrial before the same judge.
Spousal support was the principal issue on appeal. After the appellate
court reversed the first support order because it was so low it constituted
an abuse of discretion, the trial judge almost doubled the award, made it
retroactive for two years and ordered monthly payments on the "arrear-
age." 158 Following the ex-wife's second successful appeal, the appellate
court granted the litigants' request to modify the judgment rather than
remand again.
The husband had contended that no law mandated consideration of
his new wife's income in computing his ability to pay spousal support.
Relying on Gammell v. Gammell 15 9 and In re Marriage of Williams, the
appellate court disagreed." 6 The court asserted that "[t]he proper
method for determining what funds are available is to treat the combined
income of the supporting spouse and the new spouse as the income of the
new community and deduct the combined expenses of the new commu-
nity therefrom to the extent they are reasonable or necessary."
1 61
Despite the Ramer court's assertion, neither Gammell nor Williams
requires that the new spouse's income be considered on a motion to in-
154. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4722-4732 (West Supp. 1988).
155. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5120.010-5120.210 (West Supp. 1988).
156. 187 Cal. App. 3d 263, 231 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1986).
157. 191 Cal. App. 3d 966, 236 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1987).
158. Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 270, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
159. 90 Cal. App. 3d 90, 153 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1979).
160. 155 Cal. App. 3d 57, 202 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1984).
161. Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 272, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52.
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crease spousal support."62 Gammell was decided on the ex-husband's
motion to reduce spousal support to an elderly wife.163 The Gammell
court specifically declined to decide whether the second wife's income
that was available for the couple's living expenses could be considered in
granting an increase in the support award. 64 Williams involved a child
support claim only. Additionally, the stepmother had recently become
unemployed, so the decision's language that "the court should consider
the second spouse's income, f any, as available to reduce 'the paying
spouse's personal expenses"' 165 was dicta.
Different standards apply to the determination of spousal and child
support awards. This is a factor which the Ramer decision ignores. The
Agnos Act specifically grants a child the right to share in his or her par-
ent's standard of living, even where the increase over the parent's pre-
divorce standard is made possible by a new spouse's income. Spousal
support, on the other hand, is governed by Civil Code section 4801(a).
1 66
While section 4801(a) considers the obligor spouse's ability to pay, it sets
a cap on the recipient spouse's need, which is the standard of living en-
joyed during the dissolved marriage. 167 Thus, a former spouse can make
no claim to share in a higher standard of living made possible by her
former spouse's fortuitous remarriage.
The Ramer decision also ignored the legislative reclassification of
support obligations from post-marital to pre-marital debts, effective Jan-
uary 1, 1985. Most pertinent is Ramer's failure to discuss the impact of
recently enacted Civil Code sections 5120.110 and 5120.150. Section
5120.110 provides that a spouse's earnings are not liable for the other
spouse's pre-marital debts so long as the earnings are kept uncommingled
and beyond the debtor's reach. Section 5120.150 classifies support obli-
gations as premarital debts. This section also states that nothing in the
section limits what a court may consider in setting support orders. Sec-
tion 5120.320 provides that the Act is applicable to debts enforced after
its operative date regardless of when the debt was incurred.1
68
The Ramer court did not consider whether the second wife had
162. Ramer was procedurally an appeal of the trial court's order on remand following the
first appeal. Because the husband remarried during the pendency of the first appeal, analyti-
cally the case is like that of a motion to increase support based on the changed circumstance of
remarriage.
163. Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 95, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 170, 172.
164. Id. at 94, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
165. Williams, 155 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
166. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1988).
167. Id. § 4801(a)(7).
168. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.320 (West Supp. 1988).
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availed herself of the protection offered by section 5120.110 and if so,
what effect, if any, that would have on the determination of the underly-
ing obligation. The court stated that "it is abundantly clear the new
community was living well while the wife and the dependent child were
not."169 As one commentator noted, "[s]eldom does an appellate court
express such strong emotion in a published opinion." 170 While it appears
from the record that the appellate court related that the new community
was living well, it also appears from the same facts that the former wife
was living in the family home and had chosen to live off an inheritance
rather than find a job in the five years since the separation, despite the
fact that her youngest child was in high school.
1 71
The situation encountered by Mr. Ramer and his second wife illus-
trates a remarried couple's difficulty in planning their financial future
together. At the time of their wedding in late 1982, the couple expected
that Mr. Ramer would pay $550 per month in spousal support, and $300
per month in child support to his ex-wife, and that the family home
would shortly be sold and its equity of $52,000 divided equally between
Mr. Ramer and his ex-wife. 72 On remand two years later, following his
ex-wife's first appeal, the trial court retroactively increased Mr. Ramer's
spousal support obligation to $900 per month plus $100 per month on
the "arrearage" and delayed the sale of the family home until late 1987,
when the youngest child would reach eighteen.' 73 Also, while the case
was on appeal the second time, Mr. Ramer's child support obligation was
increased to $450 per month. 74 In decidimig the second appeal in late
1986, the appellate court retroactively increased the husband's spousal
support obligation to the point where the "arrearage" exceeded the value
of his equity in the family home. The court then awarded the home to
the first wife, canceling the "arrearage" it had created.'
7
1
Consider for a moment the Ramer court's conclusion that the new
community was living well while the ex-wife and child were not. Part of
the evidence that the new community was living well was the purchase of
a condominium with a monthly trust deed and association fees of
169. Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
170. 1987 CAL. FAM. L. REP. 3278.
171. Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 269-70, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
172. Id. at 258-70, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 648-49. Mr. Ramer remarried very shortly after the
trial court's decision and possibly before his first wife's appeal was ified. But even if he knew of
her appeal before his second marriage, he may also have been advised of her statistically low
chance of success.
173. Id. at 269-70, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
174. Id at 268, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
175. Id at 280, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 656-57.
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$1,500. The court apparently failed to consider whether the reason the
monthly payments were so high was because the couple lacked the abil-
ity to make more than a minimal down payment. Mr. Ramer's $26,000
in equity was tied up in the home his ex-wife and child were occupying.
Payments on the Ramer family home totalled only $517, which does not
necessarily mean it was less comfortable than the condominium.176 If
the home had been purchased several years before the couple separated,
its fair rental value would have greatly exceeded the mortgage payments.
Since the first Mrs. Ramer was enjoying exclusive occupancy at below
market rates and Mr. Ramer was denied the use of his capital, he should
have been entitled to a credit on the spousal or child payments he was
making. Unlike the situation in In re Marriage of Escamilla,1"7 Mr.
Ramer was making support payments above the level usually ordered by
trial courts.1 78 The court not only failed to consider this issue, but it also
failed to consider whether the adult children living with the first Mrs.
Ramer were contributing to the household expenses. Such oversight may
have effectively forced Mr. Ramer to contribute to the support of his
adult children.
The Ramer opinion rejected the husband's argument that basing his
spousal support obligations on his new wife's income would deter remar-
riage.1 79 The Ramer court stated:
As to deterring remarriage, we can only say that to the
extent the rule makes persons realize they may not pursue their
own pleasures in utter disregard of an earlier marriage of 22
years that has produced four children and a dependent spouse,
it is to be commended rather than faulted." °
176. I at 263, 273, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 650, 652.
177. 127 Cal. App. 3d 963, 179 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1982).
178. Mr. Ramer was under an order to pay $1000 per month in spousal support and $450
per month in child support. Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 268, 279-81, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 649,
656-57. The total equalled 36% of the combined net income of Mr. Ramer and his new wife
and equalled approximately 54% of his net disposable income. See Weitzman, The Economics
of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rnv. 1181, 1234 (1981), which notes that judges rarely order a husband
to part with more than one-third of his net income in combined spousal and child support.
179. Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
180. Id. Such language sounds almost punitive and reminiscent of the days of fault-based
divorce. The language echoes the views expressed by the author of the opinion, Justice Marcus
Kaufman, in In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982), where he stated in a con-
curring opinion:
[S]o what we have is an unfulfilled expectation that the marriage would continue
with mutual benefit accruing from the additional education afforded one spouse.
Whether early dissolution of the marriage has resulted in an injustice may well depend,
either wholly or in part, on which spouse was at fault or most at fault in bringing about
termination of the marriage. Under the Family Law Act, of course, California courts
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If the Ramer court's view that a subsequent spouse's income must
be considered in increasing a spousal support award is correct, then it
would follow that a stepparent's income must also be considered in in-
creasing child support awards. But the decision in Ramer is simply
wrong. The appellate court made two obvious errors which seriously
discredit its opinion. First, the court failed to determine the ex-wife's
earning capacity and whether she had made good faith efforts to find
suitable employment.18' Second, the court misread Gammell as support-
ing the assertions that the current spouse's income is to be considered in
increasing support payments, an issue the Gammell court specifically
stated it did not decide. The Ramer decision, therefore, cannot be used
to argue that a stepparent's resources must be considered on a motion to
increase child support, especially where the income does not increase the
parent's standard of living.
2. Impact of custodial parent's earning capacity and custodial
stepparent's earnings
In re Marriage of Nolte "2 was the first reported decision interpret-
ing the Agnos Act's application to remarried parents. In Nolte, both the
custodial mother and the father's new wife were homemakers. A few
days after the effective date of the Agnos Act, the mother requested that
the father's support payments, set four years earlier, be raised to the
Agnos Act minimum. The father, who was paying substantially below
the minimum, had been attempting to have his child support payments
reduced. Since the mother had no earnings, the trial court ordered the
father to pay the entire amount of the Agnos Act minimum. The father
claimed on appeal that the court erred in failing to consider his ex-wife's
may not receive evidence with respect to nor may they consider marital fault in dis-
solving a marriage or in dividing the marital property.
Id. at 802 (1982) (Kaufman, J., concurring), vacated, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 354 (1984) (emphasis added).
181. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988). The court also apparently failed to
order the wife to be examined by a vocational training consultant, as provided by Civil Code
§ 4801(e). See also In re Marriage of Dennis, 35 Cal. App. 3d 279, 110 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1973).
182. 191 Cal. App. 3d 966, 969-70, 236 Cal. Rptr. 706, 707-08 (1987). Despite the firmness
of the appellate court's decision, Mike Nolte may not actually have to pay the minimum
Agnos award. Marilyn Nolte subsequently married Carl Neves, who was previously married
to Mike Nolte's new wife, Pam. Each wife received custody of her children. Pam and Carl's
three children live with Pam and Mike. Carl pays $600 permonth. Marilyn and Mike's one
child lives with Marilyn and Carl. Mike was ordered to pay Marilyn $288 per month. If
Carl's $600 payment is less than the Agnos minimum for three children or if his income is high
enough to justify a supplemental award, he could be ordered to pay more child support. The
four spouses could consolidate their actions and request the court to order one net payment
from Carl to Pam.
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earning capacity and her new husband's income. 183
The Agnos Act specifically directs that the stepparent's income shall
not be considered in computing the parent's gross income, 184 but allows
the court to consider the parent's earning capacity to the extent consis-
tent with the child's best interest.185 The Nolte court noted that, histori-
cally, courts had based child support awards on earning capacity only
where it appeared there had been a deliberate attempt to avoid family
responsibilities. In determining minimum support awards, the court con-
cluded that the Act replaces that standard with the best interests test'
86
and that this is one of the few areas in which the trial court has discretion
in computing the minimum award.18 7 In affirming the lower court's de-
cision, the appellate court observed that the record failed to demonstrate:
(1) that it was in the six-year-old child's best interest that earning capac-
ity be attributed to his mother; or (2) the custodial mother's earning
capacity.
The court found no contradiction between the Agnos Act and the
statutory provisions allocating liability for debts between spouses. The
court cited Civil Code section 4724 of the Act, which allows considera-
tion of stepparent resources in determining supplementary awards to fur-
ther the legislative intent that children share in their parents' standard of
living.' 88 Taking the opposite view from Ramer, the court found nothing
in section 5120.150(c) that mandated consideration of a stepparent's
earnings.' 89 Because the mother did not seek an award above the Agnos
Act minimum, her husband's income was irrelevant.' 90 The Nolte court,
therefore, did not reach the question of how a trial court should factor
stepparent income into its supplementary award calculation. No appel-
late court has yet done so.
Trial courts charged with determining supplemental child support
awards certainly have discretion to consider the income of the noncus-
todial parent's new spouse if it is used to reduce the parent's living ex-
penses. This is true whether the income is separate or community
property. 91 An unanswered question is whether the court may consider
183. Id. at 969-70, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
184. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4721(e) (West Supp. 1988).
185. Id. § 4721(a).
186. Nolte, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 973, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 974, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
189. Id. at 975, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
190. See also In re Marriage of Bailey, 198 Cal. App. 3d 505, 243 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1988),
which held the custodial stepmother's income was irrelevant in determining the mandatory
minimum award.
191. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.150(c) (West Supp. 1988).
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the income of a noncustodial stepparent who has taken advantage of sec-
tion 5120.150 and segregated her community earnings. In such a case
her husband, the noncustodial parent, is presumably paying her living
expenses. While it is hard to imagine a trial court granting a husband's
motion to reduce child support based on the increased expenses of sup-
porting a wife in such circumstances, that is not the posture in which the
issue will arise. It is far more likely that a court will face the issue on the
custodial mother's motion to increase support following the father's re-
marriage. The father will respond that the order should remain un-
changed because his new wife's income is not reducing his living
expenses and thus his ability to pay has not increased. He could also
argue remarriage has not increased his standard of living, thus neutraliz-
ing the impact of section 4720(e), which gives a child the right to share in
his parent's standard of living. Such arguments, if supported by the evi-
dence, should be persuasive. No well-reasoned case law supports the
conclusion that the trial court must consider the stepparent's resources in
all circumstances. The Agnos Act vests discretion in the trial courts.
The practical problem in most remarriages, however, may very well
be that the stepparent cannot segregate her earnings. Even if she has no
children living with her, her husband's net income after paying support
may be insufficient to maintain them both. She would then contribute
some of her income to their joint expenses. As soon as she does, how-
ever, she opens the issue of whether she is reducing his living expenses.
The husband would probably need fairly detailed financial records to
establish that her contributions did not reduce his expenses. If the step-
parent has children living with her, the situation is even more compli-
cated. Rarely will her ex-husband's support payments cover all her
children's personal expenses (clothes, recreation, health, lessons or child
care). Assuming she contributes her earnings to the new household
budget, how can the court determine that she is paying only her and her
children's expenses and not reducing those of her new husband?
Another unanswered question is whether trial courts should treat
the custodial stepparent's income exactly like that of the noncustodial
stepparent or whether there really is a rational basis, not apparent to the
court in Shupe,192 to distinguish between the two in at least some cases.
Such a rational basis can be found in the economic reality that the custo-
dial stepparent is actually contributing to the stepchild's support by con-
tributing to the household in which the child lives. For example, if a
custodial mother and her child move into the separate property home of
192. In re Marriage of Shupe, 139 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 189 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983).
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her new husband and the noncustodial mother is thereby relieved of pay-
ing rent or making mortgage payments, the stepparent is tangibly con-
tributing to the child's support. To count his income in determining the
mother's share of responsibility for child support, without also crediting
him with the support he actually provides, is patently unfair. His situa-
tion differs from that of the noncustodial stepmother, whose spouse's
contribution is limited to a monthly check and who provides little or no
caretaking services. That difference in contributions to the children's
support is exactly why legislatures vest courts with discretion and why
guidelines governing such discretion need to be tailored to the variety of
family living situations.
C. Practical Problems
1. Motion to increase support following noncustodial
parent's remarriage
Consider the problem of C, the hypothetical client described in the
introduction. Assume that C has net earnings of $2,500 per month, re-
ceives $500 per month child support from her former-husband, F, and
that her new husband, N, has net income of $4,000 per month, $3,300
from employment and $700 from rental of separate property. N is cur-
rently paying $600 in child support for two school-age daughters. His
children's mother, M, who has not remarried, has net earnings of $1,800
per month. The client, her new husband and two sons thus have $6,400
per month or $1,600 per person available for their needs. Her husband's
ex-wife, M, and two daughters have $2,400 per month or $800 per person
available for their needs.
There appears to be a great disparity between the two household's
standards of living, especially if the client's household is enjoying sub-
stantially below market housing costs in the home she and her ex-hus-
band purchased several years before and M's household is living in a
rented house or apartment. To know to what extent N's daughters are
participating in their father's standard of living, we would need to know
how frequently they visit him overnight, whether they go on family vaca-
tions with him, whether he provides clothes and other gifts beyond the
court ordered support and whether he is putting money aside for their
college education. 193 In deciding any child support award, regardless of
193. Because money beyond that needed for daily care is usually not included in child sup-
port orders for minor children, many young people who might have benefitted from planned
savings on their behalf had the family remained intact find themselves suddenly impoverished
when they reach majority. Bruch, Problems Inherent in Designing Child Support Guidelines,
ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND
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whether either parent has remarried, a court should consider and count
the value of all assistance that the noncustodial parent provides the chil-
dren. Failure to count such assistance will discourage its continuance,
especially where a much higher support award to the custodial parent
results. Discontinuance of such assistance will further undermine the re-
lationship between the children and their noncustodial parent. But even
if N is sharing his means with his daughters far beyond the court ordered
payment, a noticeable disparity in their standards of living may remain
and M may see N's remarriage as a good time to seek a modification.
If the current support order is dated earlier than July 1, 1985, the
passage of the Agnos Act itself provides the changed circumstances nec-
essary to recalculate the award. 194 In considering M's motion, the court
would first apportion the Agnos minimum between the parents (M and
N) based on their individual incomes. Because the father has 69% of the
combined income, he would be ordered to pay 69% of the minimum
award, which in 1988 was $424 for two children.' 95 This would yield an
amount lower than his current monthly payment and would not satisfy
the mother's request. She would then request a supplemental award
under section 4724. Clearly the father has sufficient income to pay a
supplemental award. In fact, the current award is low according to pre-
Agnos standards, which suggested that a noncustodial parent earning
$4,000 per month pay $800-1000 as support for two children. 196
A court applying typical guidelines, such as those currently in use in
Santa Clara County, 197 would compare the noncustodial father's (N's)
disposable income to half the total of the father's and stepmother's (C's)
incomes and use the higher figure to determine the supplemental award.
In calculating the stepmother's disposable income, the court subtracts
the basic living expenses of her children. Thus, the court would subtract
the $500 child support award the stepmother (C) receives from her ex-
husband (F) and probably a similar amount from her own earnings. This
would leave her $2000 a month in disposable earnings, which when ad-
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS (Proceedings of the Women's Legal Defense Fund's National Con-
ference on the Development of Child Support Guidelines, Queenstown, Maryland, September
1986) (Office of Child Support Enforcement, May 1987), 41, 45 [hereinafter Bruch, Problems
Inherent].
194. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4730 (West Supp. 1988).
195. CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE §§ 11452, 11453 (West Supp. 1988).
196. Weitzman, supra note 178, at 1233-35; see also Norton, supra note 122, at 7, noting
that Santa Clara County suggested 27% of the higher earning parent's income for two
children.
197. CAL. RULES OF CT., COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Child and Spousal Support, "Ap-
pendix A," 52-64 (1984-85) [hereinafter SANTA CLARA COUNTY GUIDELINES].
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ded to N's $4000 and divided by two, would be $3000. The court would
therefore base the award on N's $4000 per month.
The guideline's direction to use the higher figure systematically fa-
vors the children whose support is at issue over the new community. The
guideline appears to be drawn from In re Marriage of Havens,"I which
affirmed that courts should consider the parent's earning capacity in set-
ting awards. But the guidelines also allow the possibility that a figure
higher than $4000 could be used. This is because the court is directed to
add to the noncustodial parent's income that portion of the stepparent's
income that defrays his expenses. Logically, if the noncustodial parent's
new spouse has less disposable income than he does, she is not defraying
his expenses. This should be especially clear if she keeps her earnings in
an uncommingled account from which she pays those expenses clearly
attributable to herself and her children.
Using a disposable income figure of $4000 per month, the court will
undoubtedly grant the ex-wife (M) an increased award, probably around
$925.199 Per section 5120.150(b), N would be well-advised to pay the
award first from his $700 in separate income and then from his commu-
nity earnings.
If C is considering leaving the workforce to become a ful-time
homemaker, she will probably find that the loss of her $2,500 per month
income would not prevent the previously described increase in N's sup-
port obligation. Even though C and N's household would now have only
$3,575 per month for four persons, that would still be almost $900 per
person, while M and her two daughters would have slightly more than
$900 per person with a $925 per month award. Another way of looking
at the situation would be to say that C's additional income is not the
source of N's increased support obligation unless the court orders him to
pay more than $900. N's obligation to support his new wife was consid-
ered by the court's decision to allow his new household approximately
the same per person income, excluding C's earnings, as his former wife
and daughters' household. If the court were to order N to pay $900 per
month and C were to quit her job, her household would still fare better
than M's because it would save work-related expenses and have the bene-
198. 125 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 178 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1981).
199. This figure is based on the assumption that the noncustodial father has his daughters
with him 20% of the time. The calculations are based on the Judicial Council guidelines, infra
note 212, which are designed to yield the same result as the Santa Clara guidelines. Since the
Judicial Council guidelines authorize a range of 15% either way, a trial judge could make an
order from $785-1060 without having to explain why she or he deviated from the guidelines.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4724(d) (West Supp. 1988). Without more exactitude, these guidelines
would appear to be of little help to a practicing attorney advising a client.
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fit of her homemaker services. And if C continues to work and segre-
gates her earnings, in the event N defaults on his child support
obligation, M cannot execute on C's individual bank account.
Still C may feel aggrieved. She married a man who was paying $600
per month in child support and now finds he must pay over $900 per
month. Even assuming F, her ex-husband, earns as much as N, her new
husband, and is therefore underpaying for his two boys, any attempt to
seek an increase from him will mean more, expensive attorney fees. She
may also be advised that her chances of substantially increasing her
award are not as good as M's because F's wife K is pregnant and has a
child who is not being supported by her own father. The Santa Clara
guidelines, however, do not provide for subtracting the basic living ex-
penses of a stepchild or child of the new marriage from the obligor-par-
ent's disposable income. Such deductions appear to be limited to the case
where the stepparent, in this case K, has income. These guidelines will
probably be revised to conform with recent amendments to the Agnos
Act. A relevant amendment, effective January 1, 1988, provides that a
parent may claim a "hardship deduction" from income to meet the mini-
mum basic living expenses of natural or adopted children from other re-
lationships who live with that parent.2" F would therefore be allowed to
deduct his new baby's living expenses, but not his stepchild's, from his
income.
2. Effect of noncustodial parent's voluntary support of stepchildren
Given the innumerable permutations of parent-child and stepparent-
stepchild relationships, somewhere along the line there will be a parent
who manages to evade support responsibility altogether and a stepparent
who willingly assumes the responsibility to support such a stepchild.
One writer who described her experiences as stepchild and stepparent
recounted how her stepfather "was forced" to stop supporting his own
children in order to support her and her brothers and sisters.20 1 Her own
father had abandoned the family. Her mother presumably was a home-
maker. The author's experience in practice revealed a strong tendency
on the part of father/stepfathers to place the needs of their stepchildren
who lived with them before those of their own children who lived with
their ex-wives or ex-girlfriends. °2
Where parents who have an obligation to pay child support for their
200. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4725(b) (West Supp. 1988).
201. E. EINSTEIN, THE STEPFAMILY: LIVING, LOVING AND LEARNING 11(1982).
202. Research on noncustodial fathers' compliance with child support obligations following
their remarriage to a custodial mother or the birth of a child in their new marriage reveals a
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own children argue that the needs of their unadopted stepchildren should
be taken into account in determining their ability to pay, how should the
courts respond? Several appellate cases have considered the issue of a
noncustodial father's conflicting obligations to the children of his first
and second marriages.2 "3 The general rule before the Agnos Act was
that it was improper to order a parent to pay more for children not in his
custody than he would have left to support his children that were in his
custody. 2" It was not clear, however, whether a father could rely on
evidence that he was voluntarily supporting his current wife's (or
cohabitor's) children to reduce his obligation to his own children. It
seems self-evident, and the Santa Clara guidelines so provide, that where
a new spouse's income is to be counted, the expenses of supporting his or
her children should be subtracted. The question considered in this sec-
tion is whether the expenses of supporting a new spouse's child from a
prior relationship may be subtracted from the stepparent's income in
cases where the child's parent has no income or the children's expenses
exceed the parent's income.
Hypothetically, if C, our client, moves for increased child support
from F, her former husband, can F subtract the living expenses of his
stepchild from his own income where K, his new wife, has neither earn-
ings nor child support income of her own and F therefore is providing
that child's entire support? The Agnos Act should control this situation.
To begin with, in apportioning the mandatory minimum award, section
472 1(c) provides that a parent's net disposable income shall be calculated
by deducting only certain specified items. One of the allowable items is,
"[a]ny child or spousal support actually being paid by the parent pursu-
ant to a court order, to or for the benefit of any person who is not a
subject of the award to be established by the court."2"5 No other refer-
ences to support payments are included in the list of allowable deduc-
tions. Section 4721(f) states, "[t]he court shall inquire of each party as
to the total number of minor children he or she is legally obligated to
support."206 Since stepparents have no personal obligation to support
their stepchildren, section 4721 implies that only the parent's support
decrease in support payments to children of the first marriage, even when the fathers were able
to support two households. Wallerstein & Corbin, supra note 15, at 115.
203. See Baron v. Baron, 9 Cal. App. 3d 933, 943, 88 Cal. Rptr. 404, 410 (1970); see also
Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 119-20, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408, 410-11 (1971).
204. Id.
205. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4721(c)(5) (West Supp. 1988)(emphasis added). This section was
amended, effective January 1, 1988, to allow deduction of child support payments being paid
pursuant to an agreement as well as pursuant to a court order.
206. Id. § 4721(f).
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obligation to his own children will be considered in determining
mandatory minimum child support awards.
This conclusion is strengthened by section 4725, which provides ad-
ditional income deductions in cases of "extreme financial hardship due to
justifiable expenses. 20 7 One of the hardships mentioned is "the mini-
mum basic living expenses of either parent's natural or adopted depen-
dent minor children from other marriages or relationships.) 20 8 This
section would apily to the parent's own children who are living in his
household.2 0 9 Therefore, a stepparent should not be able to subtract the
costs of voluntarily supporting stepchildren living in his household from
his net disposable income for the purpose of computing the mandatory
minimum award.
The next issue is whether the stepparent's contributions to his
stepchildren's support can be considered in determining whether to make
a supplemental support award. Supplemental awards are discretionary,
but the trial court's discretion is controlled by section 4724. This discre-
tion is to be guided by applicable statutes, relevant case law and state and
local guidelines as well as by the legislative intent that children share in
their parents' standard of living. Trial courts setting child support
amounts below the discretionary guidelines in use in their county must
state their reasons on the record. 10
The Judicial Council Discretionary Child Support Guidelines are to
be used in counties that have not adopted their own guidelines. 211 These
guidelines state in relevant part that: "(c) The following adjustments to
gross income are within the court's discretion: .. .(3) The court may
consider, to the extent permitted by law, the income earned by new part-
ners of either parent and the expenses related to the new partner or to
other children of that parent.2 12 The basic question is, who is covered by
the terms "other children" and "that parent"? A straight-forward read-
ing indicates that the term "parent" is used to describe the mother and
father of the children whose support is at issue in the proceeding before
the court. The "children" included in the term "other children" would
be the natural or adopted children of either parent whose support is not
at issue. If the legislature had intended to include stepchildren's ex-
207. Id. § 4725.
208. Id. § 4725(b).
209. This is confirmed by the example illustrated in the MINIMUM CHILD SUPPORT INFOR-
MATION BOOKLET, Judicial Council Form 1285.25A, 3, 4, 6 (1988).
210. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4724(d) (West Supp. 1988).
211. Id. § 4724(b).
212. CAL. RULES OF CT. DIv. VI, Discretionary Child Support, A-54 to A-55 (April 1986)
[hereinafter JUDICIAL COUNCIL GUIDELINES] (emphasis added).,
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penses, it would have referred to them as "stepchildren" or "children of
the new partner." It therefore appears that unless a stepparent can find
support in other statutes or case law, he or she will not be allowed to
reduce the amount of support due his or her noncustodial children by
voluntarily assuming the support of his or her custodial stepchildren.
Nevertheless, a stepfather resisting a request for a supplemental
award to his own children could make a sympathetic argument. First,
his wife is a homemaker who is needed by her children as a full-time
caretaker because of their age or special needs. Secondly, his stepchil-
dren's father is either missing or so impecunious that it would be futile to
try to collect child support from him. Thirdly, when his wife applied for
AFDC benefits for her children she was told that his (the stepfather's)
income disqualified her children from receiving benefits.2 13 Further-
more, he could point to the legislative intent that children share their
parents' standard of living and argue that his standard of living is much
lower than his income normally could support because he is supporting
his stepchildren.
As long as he is not supporting his stepchildren at a standard above
that which his own children will experience if he pays only the
mandatory minimum amount, this could be a persuasive argument. If it
fails, the stepfather could initiate adoption proceedings based on the nat-
ural father's consent or his abandonment.214 Once the stepfather had
adopted the children, they would be treated like children born to his sub-
sequent marriage and would therefore qualify for "extreme financial
hardship" deductions under section 4725. Their basic minimum living
expenses could then be used to reduce his noncustodial children's
mandatory minimum awards as well as the higher supplemental awards.
But not all stepfathers who would make such an argument would be
willing to adopt their stepchildren. They would balk at incurring a sup-
port obligation that would continue until the children reached the age of
majority even if their marriage to the children's mother terminated ear-
lier. Requiring legal adoption before the stepchildren's needs can be
placed on a par with those of the parent's own children would serve to
separate out those stepparents who have truly formed a parental relation-
ship with the stepchildren from those who are merely using their
stepchildren's needs to retain money in their own household or act out
their anger against their former spouses.
213. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357-933
(1981).
214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West 1982).
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3. Exercising discretion under Agnos guidelines
The Agnos Act directs counties to develop guidelines for determin-
ing supplemental awards. One county has been a pioneer in publishing
guidelines. Santa Clara County adopted a guideline effective July 1,
1987,215 which directs trial courts to use whichever of two formulas re-
suits in a higher income figure for the obligor-parent. The first formula
adds the income of the obligor-parent to that of his or her new spouse
and divides the sum in half. Expenses related to supporting the spouse's
new children are to be deducted from his or her income. The second
formula focuses on the obligor-parent's income and does not count any
part of the stepparent's income except what is actually contributed to the
parent's living expenses.216
The Santa Clara guideline appears to provide some recognition of
the noncustodial stepparent's ability to segregate her community earn-
ings, but its effect is that segregation insulates the earnings from consid-
eration in determining the amount of support only where the
noncustodial parent's income exceeds the stepparent's. This is so be-
cause the court is to use the higher of half the combined earnings or the
parent's earnings. The guideline also appears to ignore the separate or
community character of the stepparent's earnings.
If this guideline were applied only to the noncustodial parent's new
spouse, it presumably would conflict with the decision in In re Marriage
of Shupe.2 17 That case held that a statute which conclusively presumed
that custodial parents, but not noncustodial parents, had a community
interest in their new spouse's earnings lacked a rational basis and there-
fore violated equal protection guarantees.218 Unless a clear rationale for
treating custodial stepparents differently from noncustodial stepparents
is articulated, noncustodial parents are likely to challenge a guideline
215. 1987 CAL. FAM. L. REP. 3385 (1987) (emphasis added). The court will use whichever
of the following approaches produces the higher net disposable income for the payor spouse:
1) The court will add the net disposable income of the new spouse to that of the payor
and divide by two.
2) The court will use the net disposable income of the payor spouse only and ignore the
income of the new spouse except to the extent that it is used to defray the expenses of thepayor
spouse.
In approach no. 1, the court will deduct from the income of the new spouse, in arriving at
net disposable income, the basic living expenses of children living with and supported by the
new spouse, child support paid by the new spouse, as well as other appropriate "hardship
deductions."
216. Id.
217. In re Marriage of Shupe, 139 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 189 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983).
218. Id. at 1034-35, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.
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under which their new spouses' incomes are factored into the court's cal-
culation, but their ex-spouses' new mates' incomes are ignored.
If, however, the Santa Clara guideline were applied to custodial par-
ents and stepparents, it might very well decrease the amount of child
support a noncustodial parent would pay. The custodial mother who is a
homemaker or who has lower earnings than her new husband would find
half their combined income factored into the calculation. She might ex-
perience difficulty securing a supplementary award from her ex-husband
unless she could demonstrate that their child had higher needs or she
could articulate an acceptable rationale for departing from the guideline.
If other county guidelines for determining discretionary child sup-
port do not deal with the consideration of stepparent income any more
specifically than Santa Clara's or the Judicial Council's, trial judges will
have more discretion than guidance and a major goal of the Agnos Act,
to promote predictability and uniformity in support awards, will remain
unmet. The author therefore proposes that a stepparent's income should
not be considered in apportioning the discretionary child support obliga-
tion between the parents except in three circumstances:
1) The parent and stepparent have a mutual child or children
whose expenses they seek to deduct in determining the parent's ability to
contribute;
2) The parent's earnings have decreased because of the remarriage
or cohabitation, although in such cases the value of the care that parent
provides to the children must be considered;
3) The stepparent's income is commingled with the parent's and
reduces the parent's living expenses or increases the parent's standard of
living above what it would have been but for the remarriage or
cohabitation.
The first circumstance is largely self-explanatory. If a parent asserts
that he or she should contribute less to the support of some children
because of an obligation to others, it is essential to consider the ability of
the other children's other parent to share that obligation.
The second circumstance is also easy to grasp. If a parent who has
previously been employed and was contributing monetarily to her chil-
dren's support quits her job upon remarriage to become a full-time home-
maker for her second husband, it would be unfair to expect her ex-
husband to shoulder an increased share of the financial obligation. The
way to avoid this is to consider the stepfather's earnings. This analysis
would also apply to the less common case of a father who leaves a very
high-paying but demanding job for a lower-paying one because his new
spouse's income will make up the difference. He should not expect his
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children to suffer a drop in their standard of living where he has not
experienced a drop in his own standard of living.
The fairness of this second circumstance, however, depends upon
including a reasonable valuation of the parents' caretaking services in the
equation. Indeed, the most serious flaw in the Agnos Act and in child
support criteria historically is the failure to value the caretaking services
provided by parents.219 In addition to food, shelter, clothing, medical
care and education, children also require virtually constant supervision,
discipline and custodial care. This cost is apparently figured into the
support formula only when the custodial parent employs someone else to
provide these services so that she can work outside the home. The failure
to value the custodial mother's services-for in most cases she will bear a
greater portion of the childrearing burden then her ex-husband, his new
wife and her new husband combined-results in an unfair allocation of
the total responsibility for rearing children.
A more equitable allocation would be to apportion the cash costs of
rearing the children according to their parents' incomes and then calcu-
late a credit for the custodial parent for the portion of caretaking services
she provides beyond the fifty percent that is her natural obligation.220
Applying this method to the case of a custodial mother who has quit
her job upon remarriage, the court would consider the income of the
custodial stepfather and the noncustodial father in determining the
amount of any discretionary award for direct expenses. Whether the
court would also consider the income of the noncustodial stepmother
would depend upon whether she fell into any of the three categories de-
scribed above. The court would also calculate the fair market value of
the extra caretaking services the unemployed mother provides. Thus, if a
child needs seventy hours a week of supervision (excluding sleep and
school time) and the custodial mother provides sixty of those hours or
twenty-five more than her half, the court would value her services for
those twenty-five hours and credit her with that contribution. Her ex-
husband would then pay the remainder of the child's needs as his supple-
mental award. In many cases, this would negate the effect of counting
the stepfather's income. This method would also be fairer to the new
219. Although there is increased theoretical appreciation for the nonmonetary contribu-
tions of caretakers, little has been done to translate this into figures that can be used in estab-
lishing or evaluating the parties' monetary contributions. Bruch, Problems Inherent, supra
note 193, at 58.
220. Analytically, this credit payment should be considered spousal support because it com-
pensates the custodial parent for performing services that are the natural obligation of the
other spouse. But as long as California terminates spousal support at the recipient's remar-
riage, this payment must be labelled child support.
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community that is losing substantial income because the wife is caring
for her children by a prior marriage.
Fairness to the new mother/stepfather community also dictates dis-
regarding the stepfather's income in such cases. Since each spouse owes
her or his labor to the community, the homemaker who devotes a signifi-
cant part of her labor to a non-income producing separate endeavor,
which is the proper way to characterize rearing children from a former
marriage, does not fulfill her end of the implied contract. Her new hus-
band presumably understood this when he married her, but that is no
justification for saying he should pay twice; once in the loss of her earn-
ings or labor and again by assuming responsibility for his stepchildren's
bills. The Shupe court was wrong in concluding that no rational basis
exists for treating custodial and noncustodial stepparents' incomes differ-
ently. Loss of community earnings or services that the custodial house-
hold experiences when children are younger or have special needs
requiring substantial care constitutes such a reasonable basis.22'
Noncustodial parents will probably object to such an unorthodox
allocation of support costs, especially where custody itself has been dis-
puted between the parents. They might even borrow the argument from
the "wrongful life" '222 cases that the financial burden which the custodial
family bears is more than offset by the emotional rewards of raising the
children. But such factors have never been considered in apportioning
child support costs between parents. Custody is decided first in the best
interests of the children and then support is ordered according to the
parents' abilities to pay.223 That custodial parents pay with their time
away from the job market has historically been ignored. Now that so
many married women have demonstrable earning abilities, this sacrifice
must be considered in determining support.
The third circumstance in which a stepparent's income should be
considered in apportioning discretionary child support obligations be-
tween the parents is the one most closely related to the language of the
Agnos Act, but with an important clarification. It focuses on the Act's
221. This proposal, to discount the income of custodial stepparents because of the economic
contributions and/or sacrifices they already make, runs directly counter to some commenta-
tors' proposals to lessen or eliminate a noncustodial parent's financial obligation to his children
after the custodial parent's remarriage. See Redman, Stepchild Support: The Real World, 7
FAIRSHARE 8, 9 (1987). Such a policy would be disastrous to children because it would break
the link to their biological parent in favor of an ephemeral tie to their stepparent. Judge
Redman does not deal with the difficult issue of who would be responsible for the children's
support after the custodial parent's second divorce. For statistics demonstrating that lik-
lihood, see infra note 241.
222. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 708-09, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658-59 (1976).
223. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 724 P.2d 486, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1986).
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rationale for allowing consideration of stepparent income, namely, the
effect access to the stepparent's income has on the parent's financial cir-
cumstances. When a divorced parent remarries (or begins living with
another person), the parent's lifestyle will be affected in one of several
ways depending on decisions the new couple makes. First, the parent
and the new partner may pool their incomes to achieve a higher standard
of living than the parent enjoyed before the new marriage. Second, the
new couple may pool their incomes and maintain the parent's premar-
riage standard of living, accumulating joint savings. Third, the new
couple may maintain separate bank accounts, paying bills according to
an agreement and retaining savings from their incomes individually. The
issue is whether the stepparent's income should be treated differently in
any of these situations.
The first option, pooling incomes for a higher standard of living,
falls within the Agnos Act's criteria, as does the second option, pooling
incomes for higher savings. In both cases, the parent need not spend as
much of his or her income on basic living expenses and has more income
to spend on nonnecessities or to save and invest. Where the noncustodial
parent and stepparent are consuming most or all of their income to main-
tain a higher standard of living than the children, the courts may require
the parent to share that standard of living with the children by basing the
parent's total support responsibility on his or her total household in-
come. It is vital for courts in such circumstances to consider the total
amount of money the noncustodial parent devotes to the children in set-
ting the amount of the cash support payment since many noncustodial
parents spend considerable amounts directly on their children, especially
as the children grow older.
Similarly, where the noncustodial parent and stepparent have made
a decision to live moderately and save considerable income, the court
should be sensitive to the parent's values. An alternative to ordering a
large support payment would be to require the parent to make a cash
payment sufficient to support the children at his or her standard of living
and to place an appropriate portion of the new couple's savings in trust
for the children. This method not only approximates how the children
would have lived had their parents remained married, but it avoids pe-
nalizing the frugal parent, who appears to have considerable disposable
income.
Income-pooling and joint decision-making are more typical of
couples in first marriages than in remarriages, especially those following
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divorce. 2 24 In second marriages, memories of disagreements over money
in an earlier marriage or the need to maintain a degree of financial inde-
pendence as a protection against another divorce may lead the couple to
maintain separate accounts, even where they do not make a separate
property agreement. Where spouses pool only as much of their incomes
as is necessary to pay joint obligations, the amount the stepparent retains
is certainly not being used to reduce the parent's living expenses. Neither
does that amount have any bearing on the parent's ability to pay child
support. In such a case the stepparent is functionally like a roommate.
The court should inquire how much the stepparent contributes to the
joint expenses to ensure that he or she pays a fair share, but beyond that,
the stepparent's income and resources are irrelevant. Such a rule rein-
forces the point that a stepparent has no personal obligation to support a
stepchild. The rule would not penalize the children because they would
receive at least as much as they would have had their parent not remar-
ried and, by implementation of the Agnos Act's mandatory minimum
awards, they can expect to share in their higher-earning parent's stan-
dard of living.
In recommending adoption of the current debt liability statute, the
California Law Revision Commission took the position that a steppar-
ent's earnings should not be liable for child support debts because such a
law would deter remarriage, but inconsistently argued that the steppar-
ent's earnings should be considered in determining support because they
affect the parent's ability to pay.221 A couple contemplating marriage is
unlikely to consider the prospect of one spouse's default on a child sup-
port debt and, if they did, they could make a separate property agree-
ment before marriage, which would protect the stepparent's earnings.
The current debt liability law actually protects the stability of the step-
parent marriage during financial reverses by stemming the flow of money
out of that household to another. A couple contemplating marriage is
more likely to consider the effect the marriage will have on either's child
support obligations. Consideration of a stepparent's earnings will deter
remarriage where the state of the law is so uncertain that the effect of the
marriage cannot be predicted, as well as where either person's standard
of living will be lower after the marriage than before. To avoid deterring
remarriage, courts should set guidelines that are "marriage-neutral."
This means ignoring stepparent income unless a specific justification ex-
ists for considering it. The justifications should be limited to marriages
224. Fishman, The Economic Behavior of Stepfamilies, 1983 FAMILY RELATIONS 359 (July
1983).
225. See Recommendations, supra note 44, at 256.
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where additional children are born or adopted, where the parent's in-
come decreases or where the partners pool their incomes to produce a
higher standard of living than the parent enjoyed previously.
4. Motion to require sale of the family home following custodial
parent's remarriage
Before C, our client, decides to quit work, she must consider how a
relatively new code section affects her right to remain in the home she
and F, her former husband, own as tenants in common. If her exclusive
occupancy of the family home is based on a court order made after trial
or based on a negotiated agreement that was incorporated into the court
order, she must reckon with Civil Code section 4800.7, which became
effective January 1, 1985.226 Section 4800.7 authorizes a court to modify
a family home award at any time unless the former spouses have made a
nonmodifiable written agreement.227 Furthermore, the section states that
if the custodial parent remarries, she bears the burden of proving that the
temporary use award should not be terminated.228
Section 4800.7 overrules that part of In re Marriage of Escamilla
229
which held that temporary use of the family home could not be termi-
nated upon the mother's remarriage since that event was not reasonably
related to the children's need for support.230 One court of appeal panel
recently ruled that section 4800.7 may not be applied retroactively to
modify a stipulated order unless the parties intended the family home
award to be additional child support.231 If the award was intended as
child support, retroactive application of the statute would not impair due
process rights because prior to the statute's enactment, trial courts could
modify family home awards intended as child support on a showing of
226. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.7 (West Supp. 1988). This provision states in pertinent part:
(b) Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing:
(1) A family home award may be modified or terminated at any time at the discre-
tion of the court.
(2) If the party awarded the temporary use of the family home remarries... a
rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof, is created that further delay in
the sale of the family home and division of the proceeds of the sale is no longer an
equitable method of minimizing the adverse impact of the dissolution or legal separa-
tion on the welfare of the children.
(c) The provisions of this section are applicable regardless of whether the family
home award is made before or after January 1, 1985.
Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. 127 Cal. App. 3d 963, 179 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1982).
230. Id.
231. In re Marriage of Guthrie, 191 Cal. App. 3d 654, 236 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1987).
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changed circumstances without reserving jurisdi*ction.232
The award of the family home to the custodial parent is an excep-
tion to the rule requiring equal division of the community property at
dissolution. It was clearly contemplated in the Family Law Act's legisla-
tive history.233 Although not all courts agree, the court in In re Marriage
of Duke234 held that deferred sale of the home must be ordered until the
youngest child reaches majority to avoid adverse economic, emotional
and social impacts on the child resulting from an immediate loss of a
long-established family home.235 In practical terms, when a noncustodial
parent is unable to pay sufficient child support to enable the custodial
parent to purchase or rent comparable housing in the same neighbor-
hood, but where the custodial parent can, with her earnings and the child
support, maintain the family home, the court will order a deferred sale
and give the custodial parent exclusive occupancy. Often, after being so
advised by their lawyers, the spouses make a similar agreement.
Section 4800.7 originated in a California Law Revision Commission
recommendation that courts be given express statutory authority to mod-
ify or terminate a family home award in the case of the custodial parent's
remarriage or cohabitation. The Commission believed a court could find
that the presence of a third party in the home unduly increases
domestic strife..., that the presence of a third party consti-
tutes a substantial change in the need of the family unit for
protection, or simply that there is a decreased need for support
because the third party is present.2 36
The Commission's recommendation failed to explain why the possible
presence of such factors justified putting the burden of proof on the cus-
todial parent rather than on the noncustodial parent, who is the party
moving for modification and the party who normally shoulders that
burden.
232. Whether a family home award was intended as child support may be difficult to dis-
cern. Each co-tenant is equally entitled to a share in the possession of the entire property, and
neither can exclude the other from any part of it. 3 B. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Property § 216 (8th ed. 1973). Consequently where a court orders a noncustodial par-
ent to pay the mortgage payments on the family home, it frequently designates such payments
"additional child support" to avoid a reimbursement claim at the deferred sale. The underly-
ing family home award may, however, have been made for the reasons cited in In re Marriage
of Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 155-58, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444, 445-47 (1980).
233. G. BLUMBERG, COMMUNrrY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 542 0987).
234. 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1980).
235. Id. at 155-58, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47; cf. In re Marriage of Herrmann, 84 Cal. App.
3d 361, 366-67, 148 Cal. Rptr. 550, 553-54 (1978); In re Marriage of Boseman, 31 Cal. App. 3d
372, 376-77, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1973).
236. Recommendations, sutira note 44, at 266.
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The adoption of section 4800.7 demonstrates the legislature's con-
tinued uncertainty over its position on stepparents' responsibility for
child support. The legislature has repeatedly declined to impose a gen-
eral duty of support on stepparents 37 and has gone so far as to repeal
legislation that imposed such an obligation on some custodial steppar-
ents. 23' The legislature has also made provisions for balancing the sup-
port obligation between remarried parents by allowing courts to consider
stepparents' earnings in setting supplementary support awards.239
By presuming that the family home can be sold upon the custodial
parent's remarriage without adverse effect on the children, the legislature
comes very close to imposing a support obligation on custodial steppar-
ents. Sale of the home could certainly deter a custodial mother's mar-
riage to a man whose income and assets were insufficient, when combined
with her own, to purchase a comparable home. She would be forced to
choose between her own happiness and the benefits of having a stepfather
for her children on the one hand, and the financial security of remaining
in the family home on the other. She would need to consider how the
difficult transition from single parent to stepparent household would be
affected by the children's realization that the remarriage had lowered
their standard of living. The stepfather might be unable to contribute
sufficient income to the new household because he is complying with a
high child support order of his own. It would seem that all section
4800.7 accomplishes is to spare the noncustodial father the mental
anguish caused by having another man living in "his" house.
One method of opposing the noncustodial parent's motion to require
a sale, in addition to trying to carry the burden of proof that further
delay is indeed equitable, would be to seek an increase in child support
from the noncustodial parent. Either the circumstances which prevented
him from paying adequate support previously may have improved, or the
passage of the Agnos Act and the adoption of county guidelines may lead
to a more favorable recalculation. Even if the latest child support order
is dated after July 1, 1985, the fact that the family must seek new housing
will probably be a sufficient change of circumstances to justify a new
order. The difficult question is how the custodial stepfather's (N's) in-
come should be evaluated at the combined hearing on the father's (F's)
section 4800.7 motion and the mother's (C's) motion to increase child
support. Assuming that C wants to remain in the house and F wants his
equity out, it would be reasonable for C and N to refinance the house,
237. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5127.5, 5127.6 (repealed 1985).
238. Id. § 199 (repealed 1985).
239. Id. § 4724 (West Supp. 1988).
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pay F his equity, retitle the house as their community property and live
with any higher mortgage payments. If they cannot afford to refinance
the house because N's income is insufficient to qualify for the new loan,
then it is difficult to see how remarriage has improved C's economic posi-
tion. F, on the other hand, if he is successful in forcing a sale, will have
significantly greater assets as well as whatever increased earnings he has
experienced since the divorce. In such a case the court should ignore N's
earnings and recalculate F's total support obligation on the basis of his
and C's incomes. Any other method runs the risk of decreasing C and
F's children's standard of living. The children would lose their family
home because their mother has remarried. Furthermore, they would be
forced to move to a smaller house or a less desirable neighborhood be-
cause their father is allowed to pay no greater or even less child support.
The justification for this would be their mother's illusory increase in
community income.
Section 4800.7 imposes a serious financial penalty upon the remar-
riage of a custodial parent who has received a family home award. She
must carry the burden of proving that continued deferral of the sale of
the home is still an equitable method of minimizing the adverse impact of
the divorce on the children.2' If she fails to meet this burden, the home
will be sold and the proceeds divided even though her new marriage may
quickly founder,2"' leaving her children without a comparable home.
Furthermore, current law leaves open the possibility that the noncus-
todial parent's remarriage could be "a change in circumstances affecting
the economic status of the parties" that would also shift the burden of
proof to the custodial parent.
Section 4800.7 should be amended in three respects.242 First, a fain-
240. Id. § 4800.7(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
241. Statistics show that among people who have divorced once, the median duration of
marriage before the first divorce was 6.5 years; if both had been divorced before, the duration
before the next divorce was 3.5 years; and if both had been divorced twice, the duration of
marriage before the next divorce was only 1.7 years. D. MAYLEAS, REWEDDED BLIss 11
(1977); see also U.S' BUREAU OF CENSUS, NUMBER, TIMING AND DURATION OF MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCES IN THE UNITED STATES: JUNE 1975 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SE-
RIES P-20 No. 297 (1976); and VISHER & VISHER, supra note 18, at xix, citing reports that 40
percent of second marriages end in divorce within four years.
242. See also Senate Bill 1341 (Hart and Watson), introduced Mar. 6, 1987, which would
repeal § 4800.7 and provide guidelines for ordering deferred sale of the family home. The
measure would require a judge dividing community property in a dissolution involving minor
children to consider specific factors relating to the children in deciding whether or not to force
the sale of the family home. The criteria include the length of time the child has lived in the
home, the child's school placement, the home's proximity to school and child care, the home's
adaptation to accomodate a particular child's disability, the emotional detriment to the child
of a change in residence, the proximity of the home to the custodial parent's employment, the
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ily home award should be terminated only upon a showing of good cause
by the noncustodial parent. Good cause must be directly related to a
change in the children's need to remain in the home. Second, the non-
custodial parent's remarriage should not constitute good cause. The
birth of a child to the new marriage could, however, constitute good
cause. The noncustodial parent's remarriage will not directly affect the
children's need to remain in the home. Third, the noncustodial parent
should not be allowed to bring a termination motion based on the custo-
dial parent's remarriage until one year after the remarriage. This would
give the custodial parent and stepparent time to decide if they wish to
remain in the home and refinance it to purchase the other parent's eq-
uity. More importantly, it would give the custodial parent an opportu-
nity to assess her second marriage's stability before she must risk the loss
of her children's home.
V. STEPPARENT'S LIABILITY FOR CHILD SUPPORT DEBTS
4. Issues During the Second Marriage
Two issues likely to arise during a stepparent's marriage are the lia-
bility of the stepparent's earnings and property for child support arrear-
ages and the parent's responsibility, if any, to manage separate property
in a way that maximizes income from which the parent can pay support.
Prior to passage of the Agnos Act and debt liability statutes, no
California appellate court had decided whether a stepparent's earnings
could be garnished to satisfy her spouse's child support obligation. But
in Van Dyke v. Thompson' a Washington appeals court, interpreting
somewhat different community property law, narrowly decided that a
noncustodial stepmother's earnings could not be garnished. 'the situa-
tion is a common one. When the husband and wife divorced, she was
awarded custody and he was ordered to pay child support. The husband
remarried and later became unemployed. When he stopped making sup-
port payments, his ex-wife applied for welfare benefits. The state sought
reimbursement from the husband's second wife, who was employed, con-
tending that under the community property system, both spouses' earn-
ings were liable for either's debts. In a 4-3 decision, the majority held
that child support was a pre-marital debt, for which the other spouse's
earnings were not liable.2" The majority also relied on the common-law
parents' financial ability to obtain suitable housing, the tax consequences to the parents, the
economic detriment to the noncustodial parent and any other factors the court deems just and
equitable.
243. 95 Wash. 2d 726, 630 P.2d 420 (1981).
244. Id. at 733. 630 P.2d at 423.
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tradition that only custodial stepparents have a support duty, reasoning
that if the legislature had intended to hold noncustodial stepparents lia-
ble, it would have done so unequivocally.245
A strong dissent argued that the basis of the community property
system is equal ownership regardless of which spouse earns the money
and, therefore, a stepparent's community earnings should not be ex-
empted from liability for the parent's obligations. 2' At the time Van
Dyke was decided, California classified child support obligations as post-
marital debts. Thus, whether it would have followed the reasoning of the
Van Dyke majority that the stepparent's earnings should be exempt from
liability only for pre-marital debts, or that of the dissent, a California
court might well have held a noncustodial stepparent's earnings liable if a
similar case had arisen before the passage of the current debt liability
statutes. 247
The weakness of the minority position is that under a threat of gar-
nishment, a California stepparent need only separate from the obligor
parent to make her future earnings her separate property and put them
beyond the reach of her husband's creditors.248 The results are two bro-
ken homes instead of one and no reimbursement to the taxpayers. Worse
yet, a stepmother who separates from the obligor parent in order to pre-
serve her modest earnings for the benefit of her own children may find
that she cannot adequately support the children on her own and may
apply for welfare benefits herself.
Such an unfortunate event will not Occur under the current debt
liability statutes. Civil Code section 5120.150(a) protects the steppar-
ent's future earnings from garnishment249 as well as protecting her un-
commingled community earnings from seizure to pay her husband's
support arrearages. This rule will not harm children being supported by
welfare benefits because they will continue to receive benefits despite
their father's inability to reimburse the county. Where the children are
not receiving welfare because their mother's and/or stepfather's income
disqualifies them, they will receive less support because of this rule only
245. Id. at 732, 630 P.2d at 422. Washington apparently considers the support of a child in
the couple's home to be a community obligation even if the child is a stepchild of one spouse,
but considers the support of a child not in the parent-spouse's custody to be the separate
obligation of the parent-spouse. Riley, Stepparent's Responsibility of Support, 44 LA. L. REv.
1753, 1769 (1984).
246. Van Dyke, 96 Wash. 2d at 734-35, 630 P.2d at 424 (Utter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
247. See Reppy, supra note 86 at 204-06.
248. CAL. CiV. CODE § 5118 (West 1983).
249. Id. § 5120.150(a) (West Supp. 1988); see also Recommendations, supra note 44, at 256-
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where their stepmother has had the forethought and ability to save un-
commingled earnings. Such savings are probably crucial to the second
marriage's survival during the father's prolonged unemployment.
Ordinarily, neither spouse has any responsibility to the other with
respect to the management of separate property. If section 5120.150(b) is
to have any impact, it should carry with it a duty to make the parent's
separate property income-producing if that can be done without destroy-
ing the nature of the property. Property produces benefit to its owner in
one of three ways: it allows current enjoyment, it produces income or it
appreciates in value. Property that allows current enjoyment such as
jewelry or motor vehicles need not be liquidated to produce income
whether it is enjoyed by the obligor parent alone or shared with his
spouse. But the distinction between income and appreciation is illusory,
as Professor Blumberg clearly explained in criticizing the Uniform Mari-
tal Property Act's decision to characterize separate property appreciation
as separate and separate property income as community:
If a spouse decides to invest his separate property in a growth
stock for its appreciation, he preserves the separate nature of
that property. If, instead, he buys a bond for its interest, the
bond generates community income .... Furthermore, in the
individual business, partnership or closely-held corporation, the
allocation between appreciation and income is in the hands of
the managing spouse since he or she decides whether and how
much to draw out of the business. Unless we develop some
notion of imputed income when separate property business in-
come is reinvested rather than withdrawn, the decision to rein-
vest will deprive the marital community of its proper share....
The nub of the problem is that appreciation and income are
economically indistinguishable."'
This analysis applies with equal force to the issue of what separate
property should be used to pay child support obligations. Section 5125
should be amended to impose a duty on a spouse with children from
prior relationships to make most types of separate property income-pro-
ducing. That duty could be met, for example, by renting out a vacation
home rather than allowing it to sit empty or lending it to friends when
the family is not using it. With investments, the duty would be met by
investing to maximize income rather than appreciation. In the absence
of such action, a fair rate of income should be imputed.
250. BLUMBERG, supra note 233, at 100.
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B. Problems Arising at Termination of Stepparent's Marriage
1. Liability for arrearages
Even given the best intentions (and such intentions are not always
present) a parent under a child support order may allow arrearages to
accumulate. The parent may become unemployed and not realize that
this "changed circumstance" will not be recognized as grounds to reduce
support payments unless he obtains a court-ordered modification or a
stipulation from his ex-spouse.251 The parent may be unaware of the
amount owed, such as when orders include responsibility for medical and
dental costs not covered by insurance. Or the parent may simply have
stopped paying to conserve resources for his new household and been
lulled by lack of immediate legal action into believing his ex-wife will not
seek to recover the arrearages.
Whatever the cause of the arrearage, if the noncustodial parent dies
owing child support payments, his surviving spouse-the child's steppar-
ent-may be left to pay the bill. At least two appellate cases252 decided
prior to the passage of the current debt liability statutes held that support
arrearages from a prior marriage are chargeable against the community
property of a subsequent marriage. Moreover, these cases held that the
surviving spouse is personally liable for the arrearage up to the amount of
nonexempt community property she owned and community and separate
property she received from her deceased husband without Probate Court
administration.253
In In re Marriage of D'Antoni,5 a the husband died leaving spousal
and child support debts from his first marriage. He also left a home,
which was the community property of his second marriage. His ex-wife
251. See, eg., In re Marriage of Koppelman, 159 Cal. App. 3d 627, 633, 205 Cal. Rptr. 629,
633 (1984); In re Marriage of Acosta, 67 Cal. App. 3d 899, 901-02, 137 Cal. Rptr. 33, 34
(1977).
252. In re Marriage of D'Antoni, 125 Cal. App. 3d 747, 178 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1981); In re
Marriage of Barnes, 83 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1978).
253. Support arrearages also constitute a creditor's claim against the decedent's estate,
which is normally all his separate property and his half of the community property. The
widow has the option to probate her half of the community property. CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 13502, 13553 (West Supp. 1988).
254. 125 Cal. App. 3d 747, 178 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1981). While it reached the same conclu-
sion on liability as the D'Antoni court, the appellate panel in In re Marriage of Barnes, 83 Cal.
App. 3d 143, 152-53, 147 Cal. Rptr. 710, 715-16 (1978), held that the former wife's right was
qualified and that the widow was entitled to a judicial inquiry into any defenses, counterclaims,
or setoffs she might have. This may be an illusory protection for the surviving spouse, who
may never have been aware of the obligation, may lack access to the decedent's records (as-
suming he kept any) and lacks access to the decedent's testimony on such issues as actual
payment and release.
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sought to levy execution against the community property. Although the
trial court rejected her claim, the appellate court reversed, relying on
former Probate Code section 205.255 That section has been recodified
twice, first as Probate Code section 694.4 and most recently as Probate
Code sections 13550-13554.26 The Probate Code says that when a mar-
ried person dies, the surviving spouse is personally liable for the dece-
dent's debts up-to the limits specified in the code. Those limits are the
sum of the survivor's half interest in the community property, and the
portions of the decedent's community property and separate property
which the survivor receives. These sections apply when the decedent's
estate is not administered in formal probate proceedings.
A crucial question is whether Civil Code sections 5120.110(b) and
5120.150(a), which insulate the stepparent's uncommingled earnings
from liability for support debts, conflict with Probate Code sections
13550-13554. The answer would seem to turn on whether uncommin-
gled community earnings are exempt from "enforcement of a money
judgment" as required by Probate Code section 13551(a). The legislature
clearly intended that the stepparent's uncommingled community earn-
ings be exempt from enforcement of a money judgment for any premari-
tal debt of the other spouse, including child support, that was executed
on during the debtor's lifetime.25 7 To destroy this protection at the time
of the parent's death, just when the surviving spouse may need it most,
would be unjust. Yet the uncommingled earnings of the stepparent re-
main community property. If the earnings represent more than one-half
of the total community property and her deceased husband left a will
giving his half of the community property to his children, the stepmother
255. CAL. PROB. CODE § 205 (repealed 1985).
256. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 13550-13554 (West Supp. 1988). "Except as provided in Sec-
tions 951.1, 13552, 13553, and 13554, upon the death of a married person, the surviving spouse
is personally liable for the debts of the deceased spouse chargeable against the property de-
scribed in Section 13551 to the extent provided in Section 13551." Id. Section 13551 states:
The liability imposed by Section 13550 shall not exceed the fair market value at
the date of the decedent's death, less the amount of any liens and encumbrances, of
the total of the following:
(a) The portion of the one-half of the community and quasi-community prop-
erty belonging to the surviving spouse under Sections 100 and 101 that is not exempt
from enforcement of a money judgment and is not administered in the estate of the
deceased spouse.
(b) The portion of the one-half of the community and quasi-community prop-
erty belonging to the decedent under Sections 100 and 101 that passes to the surviv-
ing spouse without administration.
(c) The separate property of the decedent that passes to the surviving spouse
without administration.
Id.
257. See generally Recommendations, supra note 44.
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would be forced to part with some of her uncommingled earnings to ful-
fill the terms of the bequest. Assuming, however, that the stepparent's
liability is to be no greater if she does not probate her late husband's
estate than if she does, Probate Code section 980(e) provides some gui-
dance. That section states that in probate proceedings the decedent's
debts shall be apportioned to all property of the spouses liable for the
debts."5 8 Because the surviving spouse's uncommingled earnings are not
liable for premarital debts, the decedent's death would not expose them
to liability in probate proceedings.
The legislature does not seem to have anticipated this conflict. Al-
ternatively, it may have assumed the issue was determined by reference
to Code of Civil Procedure section 695.020, which defines what share of
the community property is exempt from a money judgment.2 5 9 That sec-
tion refers.back to the Civil Code title defining liability of marital prop-
erty for debts. The problem is that while Civil Code sections 5120.110(a)
and 5120.150(b) exempt the non-debtor spou'se's uncommingled earnings
from the other's child support debts regardless of the percentage of the
community property those earnings represent, Probate Code section
13551 imposes debt liability on the debtor spouse's half interest in the
community regardless of its source. One possible way to harmonize this
conflict would be to limit the surviving spouse's protection of her uncom-
mingled earnings to one-half the community property on hand at the
debtor's death.
Sound policy would dictate continuing the protection of the step-
parent's uncommingled earnings after the obligor-parent's death. In a
statutory scheme that systematically favors the claims of children over
those of the new spouse, the protection of uncommingled earnings at
least draws a line that says "this far and no farther." The stepmother
will not be forced to separate from her husband in order to protect her
future earnings from garnishment. After the husband's death this inter-
est in preserving the second marriage necessarily disappears, but the step-
mother's need for support may become even more acute. Given that the
children have a claim on their late parent's estate for future support,"6
which will be satisfied before the widow inherits, the law should at least
leave the widow her own earnings. As creditors, the children can force
the widow to probate their late father's estate, which would include all
his separate property and his half of the community property, but usually
not property held in joint tenancy, which would now be the widow/step-
258. CAL. PROB. CODE § 980(e) (West 1987).
259. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 695.020 (West Supp. 1988).
260. See infra notes 273-78 and accompanying text.
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mother's separate property.26 1 How strange would be a law that pro-
tected the stepmother's earnings from child support debts during the
marriage only if they were in an uncommingled account in her name
alone and not if they were in a joint tenancy account, but upon her
debtor-husband's death reversed the result! In such a case, the step-
mother's only sure protection would be a premarital agreement making
her earnings separate property.
The difficult issue is whether property purchased with community
property of the second marriage and titled as joint tenancy should be
subject to the children's claim for support arrearages. During marriage,
joint tenancy property is considered to be half the separate property of
each spouse. Frequently, one spouse's creditors attempt to set the title
aside so that they can reach the entire property. To do so, the creditors
must show the transfer made the debtor insolvent. This works well when
debtors attempt to transfer title on the eve of execution. But many mid-
dle income couples routinely put title in joint tenancy form at the time of
acquisition. After the parent's death, it would be extremely difficult for
the children to prove the title choice made their parent insolvent, since
one-half the property was still within their reach. It was their parent's
death and the survivorship characteristic of joint tenancy that removed
the property from their grasp.
Children should be treated at least as well as other premarital credi-
tors in enforcing their support claims. But in this situation, premarital
creditors will lose. The question is, therefore, should children be treated
better than other premarital creditors? Children should be treated better
in a situation where the stepparent is attempting to claim both the advan-
tages of exemption of uncommingled earnings and joint tenancy prop-
erty. The stepparent should be allowed to protect uncommingled
earnings or joint tenancy property, but not both. But where the steppar-
ent has no uncommingled earnings, the equities are different. If the step-
parent contributed earnings to the joint tenancy before Civil Code section
5120.110 was enacted, he or she should be able to protect those earnings
through the change in form. However, in cases where the stepparent was
on notice of the arrearage, the children's claim should prevail. Where
the stepparent did not know of the arrearage, he Ior she has not taken
unfair advantage of the children, such as by urging their parent to de-
261. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 323, 422 (West Supp. 1988) (creditors' right to administer es-
tate); Silva v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 2d 521, 189 P.2d 314 (1948); In re Edward's
Estate, 154 Cal. 91, 97 (1908); CAL. PROB. CODE § 704.4 (West Supp. 1988) (community
property part of probate estate).
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fault, and should not be forced to surrender the protection of joint ten-
ancy title on which he or she may have relied.
To settle this uncertainty, existing statutes should be modified in
three areas to increase protections for stepparents without depriving chil-
dren of remarried parents of their entitled support. A stepparent, espe-
cially one who is economically dependent upon her spouse, needs and
deserves financial security. Current law provides a measure of security
for the working stepparent during the marriage by protecting her uncom-
mingled community earnings from liability for her husband's child sup-
port obligations. That security should be extended beyond the second
marriage in three ways.
First, the stepparent's uncomminged earnings or her half of the
community property, whichever is greater, should not be liable for the
post-death support claims of her deceased spouse's children. Current law
would allow the children to reach their stepmother's uncommingled
community earnings if they represented more than half of the commu-
nity property because the deceased parent's estate-his separate property
and his half of the community property-is liable for their future sup-
port.262 There is no logical reason why the employed stepmother's prop-
erty that was not liable for their support during her marriage to their
father should become liable at his death. The children's standard of liv-
ing can be protected by Social Security benefits263 or insurance on the
parent's life.264
Second, if an arrearage exists at the time of the parent's death, it
should be paid first from the parent's separate property. Current law
apportions the decedent's debts according to the amount of the spouses'
property that is liable for the debts. 265 But during the marriage the dece-
dent was obliged to pay child support first from his separate income, if
any. The purpose of this rule is to allow the second community the bene-
fit of its labors as long as the children's needs are met. At death, the
distinction between separate property and its income vanishes. Even if
the decedent who allowed arrearages to accumulate had only non-income
producing separate property during his life, and therefore did not breach
his duty to his second spouse to pay support obligations from separate
income before using community funds, that spouse should still have a
262. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
263. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4705 (West 1983).
264. Cf CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.4 (West Supp. 1988) authornzm tie court, in determining
amount of spousal support obligation, to include amount sufficient to allow supported spouse
to maintain insurance on the life of the obligor-spouse to secure support following the obligors
death.
265. CAL. PROB. CODE § 980(e) (West 1987).
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superior claim on her husband's half of the community property as long
as the debt to his children is paid. Put another way, if a parent who owns
considerable separate property and possibly even more separate than
community property dies intestate, his children should not be able to
claim against the community as creditors and also take their intestate
share of his separate property relatively unreduced by debt payments.
Third, the stepparent's uncommingled earnings should not be liable
for arrearages existing at the parent's death. Currently it is unclear
whether the stepparent's uncommingled earnings can be reached for ar-
rearages at death when the stepparent takes the parent's property with-
out administration.266 Just as in the prior case, there is no reason why
the stepmother's property that was protected from liability for child sup-
port debts during the marriage should be exposed to liability at the mar-
riage's termination.
The issue of liability for arrearages may also arise during the obli-
gor-parent and stepparent's dissolution action. Except in unusual cases
where a stepparent has led a child to believe he or she is that child's
natural parent 267 or where a stepparent has contracted to support a
stepchild,26" responsibility for support ends at his or her divorce from the
child's parent. The stepparent's earnings become separate property when
the couple separates. 269 Thus, they are not liable for the parent's on-
going support obligation. Furthermore, the stepparent's share of the
community property comes to him or her free of any unadjudicated
claim for child support arrearages, including those accrued during the
marriage. This is so because Civil Code section 5120.160(b) protects the
property a spouse receives in the division of community property from
debts incurred by the person's spouse before or during marriage unless
the court assigned the debt to the nondebtor spouse for payment or un-
less the property was previously encumbered by a lien.270 The problem a
divorcing stepparent may confront, however, is that the obligor-parent
may list his child support arrearage as a community debt, agreeing that it
should be assigned to him, but claiming an offsetting share of community
property. This appears to be the proper course where arrearages accrued
266. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
267. See, eg., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 849, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121, 122
(1979); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 673-74, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 717 (1961).
268. See, eg., In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 353-54, 551 P.2d 323, 330-31, 131
Cal. Rptr. 3, 10-11 (1976); Glickman v. Collins, 13 Cal. 3d 852, 862-63, 533 P.2d 204, 210-11,
120 Cal. Rptr. 76, 82-83 (1975).
269. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West 1983).
270. Id. § 5120.160(b) (West Supp. 1988).
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during the marriage.71 But arrearages incurred before the marriage areto be assigned to the obligor without offset.2 72
2. Liability for future support following parent's death
In order to understand and secure her financial position, it is not
sufficient for a stepmother to know the extent of her spouse's child sup-
port obligation and know that the obligation has been met. His minor
children from prior relationships have a claim on his assets for their fu-
ture support that survives his death.2 73 A stepmother may be the legatee
of her husband's half of their community property and his separate prop-
erty under his will, but his minor children's future support rights will
take precedence because once again they claim as creditors while she is
merely an heir.274 Property which was acquired through a stepparent's
earnings or which was in daily use during the subsequent marriage can
be taken to pay future support claims.
This situation could upset the expectations of spouses who thought
they had made careful estate plans. For example, many attorneys rou-
tinely advise married couples to take title to major assets as community
property rather than as joint tenants in order to secure the income tax
advantage of receiving a stepped up basis to the decedent's date of death
on the entire property.275 But joint tenancies will most probably pass to
the survivor free of any creditor's claims against the deceased joint ten-
ant. 76 By titling property as community property to gain future tax ad-
vantages, the couple may be exposing the parent's half to his children's
271. Id. § 4800(c)(2).
272. Id. § 4800(c)(1).
273. 4 C. MARKEY, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 23.28[3]
(1987); Taylor v. George, 34 Cal. 2d 552, 556, 212 P.2d 505, 508 (1949); Lynn v. Hubbard, 25
Cal. App. 3d 603, 605, 102 Cal. Rptr. 303, 303 (1972); Stebbins v. Imerman, 21 Cal. App. 3d
942, 945, 98 Cal. Rptr. 865, 867 (1971).
274. 4 C. MARKEY, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 23.28[3]
(1987); Taylor v. George, 34 Cal. 2d 552, 556, 212 P.2d 505, 508 (1949); Lynn v. Hubbard, 25
Cal. App. 3d 603, 605, 102 Cal. Rptr. 303, 303 (1972); Stebbins v. Imerman, 21 Cal. App. 3d
942, 945, 98 Cal. Rptr. 865, 867 (1971).
275. I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6) (West Supp. 1988).
276. King v. King, 107 Cal. App. 2d 257, 236 P.2d 912 (1951). Cf. CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 5305 (West Supp. 1988), which creates a presumption that funds on deposit in certain joint
tenancy accounts of spouses remain their community property. Whether this is sound policy is
arguable. Placing assets purchased with community funds in joint tenancy title usually trans-
mutes the asset to one-half the separate property of each spouse as well as providing automatic
survivorship rights. This form of title takes the property out of the decedent's estate. If the
change in title occurred while the obligor-parent was in arrears and rendered him insolvent, it
could be voided as a fraudulent conveyance. But where the obligor is paying his support pay-
ments regularly and simply wants to benefit his current spouse instead of his children, it is not
a fraudulent conveyance.
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claims for future support. This could be particularly disastrous where
the property involved is the family home of the widow and her children.
It could also be quite unfair to the surviving spouse who provided the
larger share of community earnings during a lengthy marriage. During
lengthy marriages it becomes infeasible to retain the bulk of a steppar-
ent's earnings in an uncomminged account and the money is necessarily
invested in various properties, forfeiting whatever protection it enjoyed
under section 5120.110(b).
Many noncustodial parents arrange to meet post-death child sup-
port obligations through life insurance or expect that Social Security sur-
vivor's payments will suffice.2 77 They should be aware that the probate
court lacks jurisdiction to reduce the child support order; however, the
deceased parent's personal representative could seek a reduction based
on changed circumstances by substituting into the dissolution pro-
ceedings.27 8
3. Reimbursement claims
Whether the subsequent marriage ends by death or by divorce, a
stepparent who believes her spouse has improperly paid support obliga-
tions from community funds when he had separate income available may
make a claim for reimbursement on behalf of the community.279 Section
5120.150(b) represents a preference for the second community over the
obligor-parent's separate estate. If the obligor-parent has nonexempt
separate property income, he is to exhaust that income in making his
support payments before resorting to community funds, including his
own earnings. Thus, the second community gains an opportunity to im-
prove its standard of living or accumulate savings that otherwise would
be the obligor-parent's separate property.
The legislative history of section 5121.150(b)280 incorrectly states
that subdivision (b) codifies the rule in Weinberg v. Weinberg. 281 Wein-
berg involved a husband who possessed far greater separate than commu-
277. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4705 (West 1983), granting credit against noncustodial parent's
support obligation for Social Security Act or Railroad Retirement Act benefits received by the
child because of the noncustodial parent's retirement or disability unless those benefits were
considered in setting the amount of support. See also Taylor, 34 Cal. 2d at 558, 212 P.2d at
508; Estate of Schumacher, 18 Cal. App. 3d 146, 152-54, 95 Cal. Rptr. 572, 574-76 (1971).
278. C. MARKEY, supra note 273, at § 23.28[3] (1987); Kress v. Kress, 219 Cal. App. 2d
173. 174-75, 33 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79 (1963); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 385 (West Supp. 1988).
279. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.150(b) (West Supp. 1988).
280. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.150(b), Legislative Committee Comment-Assembly, 1984
Addition (West Supp. 1988).
281. 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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nity income. Nevertheless, during marriage he paid substantial support
obligations from his community income. At dissolution his second wife
sought reimbursement of the entire amount on the theory that the pay-
ments did not benefit the community and therefore should have been
charged against his separate property. The court granted only partial
reimbursement, holding that since the amount of the obligation was de-
termined by his total income, payment should have been apportioned be-
tween the separate and community income in the proportions each bore
to his total income.282 If an identical case arose under section
5120.150(b), the second wife would totally prevail and the community
would be fully reimbursed. This is the correct result and courts should
ignore the mistaken legislative history and the partially contradictory
holding in Weinberg.
Although reimbursement claims will usually arise at death or di-
vorce, a stepparent may have to risk disrupting her marriage to preserve
her reimbursement right if she gains actual knowledge that the commu-
nity funds have been used. Section 5120.150(b) does not specify, how-
ever, whether the actual knowledge that triggers the three-year statute of
limitations is mere knowledge that community property was used to pay
the support debt, or knowledge that community property was used at a
time when nonexempt separate property income was available. If it is
the former, then many stepparents will find their reimbursement right
cut off because they knew their spouse paid support from his current
community earnings. But since the law currently affords stepparents no
right to knowledge of their spouse's separate property or income, 83 how
are they to know whether it was available at any given time? The section
should be interpreted to require knowledge that nonexempt separate
property was available when community property was used. Further-
more, because Civil Code section 5125(e) imposes a duty on spouses to
pay prior support obligations with separate income, section 5125(e)
should be amended to require these spouses to disclose their separate
property and income to their current spouse.
Likewise, a stepparent may know that her spouse has separate prop-
erty income, but if he deposits both it and his current community earn-
ings in his individual account and pays child support from that account,
how is she to know from what source he intended to pay the debt? The
stepparent should be able to argue that a reverse "family expense pre-
282. Id. at 571, 432 P.2d at 717, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
283. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125.1 (West Supp. 1988), effective July 1, 1987, which grants
spouses a right to an accounting of the community property without having to initiate divorce
proceedings.
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sumption"28 4 applies. The family expense presumption assumes that
family living expenses paid from an account in which separate and com-
munity property have been commingled are paid first from community
funds. The reverse argument would be that separate debts paid from a
commingled account are presumed to be paid first from separate funds so
that funds remaining in the account or later purchases from the account
are presumed to be community property. Use of the reverse presumption
would obviate the need to make a reimbursement claim because the obli-
gor-spouse would be deemed to have paid support from his separate in-
come, whatever his actual intentions.
VI. PREPARING FOR STEPPARENTHOOD
The author now turns to the client's final question, is there anything
parents contemplating a second marriage can do to secure their financial
future? As previously discussed,285 they can agree to segregate the step-
parent's earnings in order to reduce the likelihood that those earnings
will result in a higher support order and to protect them from liability for
arrearages. They can also plan to keep careful records and avoid com-
mingling community and separate property. This, along with maximiz-
ing the income derived from separate property, will insure the support
obligations are paid from the parent's separate property wherever possi-
ble and avoid reimbursement claims. Beyond that, prospective spouses
may wonder whether they would be better off with a written premarital
agreement or whether they could avoid any of the problems of step-
parenthood by living together without marriage.
A. Use of Premarital Agreements
In In re Marriage ofShupe,28 6 the mother and stepfather's premari-
tal agreement making their earnings separate property was effective for
two purposes. It insulated the stepfather's earnings from liability for his
stepchild's support and it persuaded the court to disregard his earnings
in determining how to apportion child support between his wife and her
ex-husband. Today in California, such an agreement probably would not
accomplish the second purpose and in certain circumstances might not
even accomplish the first.
The Agnos Act controls trial courts' discretion to consider steppar-
ent earnings in support cases. Where the parent and stepparent pool
284. See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
285. See supra notes 154-181 and accompanying text.
286. 139 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 189 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983).
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their earnings and achieve a higher standard of living than the parent
enjoyed before remarriage, or where greater disposable income results in
higher savings and investments, courts are likely to consider the new
spouse's earnings in determining supplemental support awards regardless
of their separate or community character.
This new rule will have little impact on the custodial stepparent be-
cause his stepchildren are already enjoying the increased standard of liv-
ing his earnings make possible. The custodial stepparent's financial
expectations will be thwarted only if the noncustodial parent is successful
in reducing his support obligation based on the custodial parent's fortui-
tous remarriage. For example, if F is successful in reducing his obliga-
tion to C on the grounds that N's income allows C to pay a larger share
,of the children's expenses, N will see a reduction in his disposable
income.
However, the noncustodial stepparent's situation is different, and a
separate property agreement may be of little assistance in guaranteeing
her "what she bargained for." Under the various state and local guide-
lines,287 her income will likely be added to that of her new husband's in
determining his ability to pay. Prior case law was undecided on the pro-
priety of counting the separate income of a stepparent or subsequent
spouse that was not actually used for household expenses.288 The Agnos-
mandated guidelines do not seem to have made a specific provision for
disregarding either separate income-not used for household expenses or
community income kept in an uncommingled account.2 89 While courts
retain discretion to disregard such income, the stepparent-to-be still faces
uncertainty as to her new household's financial resources or even its fi-
nancial viability. The simple reason is that in the case of the noncus-
todial stepparent, the higher child support expenditures flow out of the
new household, while in the case of the custodial stepparent, the benefits
of higher expenditures are frequently shared by the entire household.
Despite the relative certainty that earnings made separate property
by agreement will be considered by trial courts in setting child support
amounts if they are used to reduce the parent's living expenses, those
contemplating marriage may- still wish to make separate property agree-
ments to protect their earnings and property purchased from their earn-
ings from liability for arrearages in cases where it is not feasible to keep
the earnings in an uncommingled account. Prior to the adoption of the
287. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL GUIDELINES for counties that have not adopted their own
guidelines, supra note 212; see also SANTA CLARA COUNTY GUIDELINES, supra note 197.
288. Gammell v. Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d 90, 94; 153 Cal. Rptr. 169, 171-72 (1979).
289. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL GUIDELINES, supra note 212.
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Uniform Premarital Agreement Act290 in California, such agreements
undoubtedly would have been effective to protect the stepparent's earn-
ings. The standard for determining the validity of the agreement in a
dispute between the spouses was whether the objective terms of the
agreement promoted divorce.29 1 Examples of such terms were waivers of
spousal support rights and agreements conferring substantial settlements
in the event of no-fault divorce. 292 Agreements dealing with property
rights during the marriage were routinely upheld.293 It is difficult to see
how a separate property agreement, even if made to protect the steppar-
ent's earnings from liability for child support, could have been invali-
dated as encouraging divorce.
Similarly, under the pre-1986 standards, third party creditors have
not been successful in attacking the validity of separate property premar-
ital agreements.2 94 Because the agreements were made before marriage,
and therefore before the debtor had any rights in his fiancee's earnings,
the agreements could not be set aside as fraudulent transfers.295 Indeed,
an important reason for separate property premarital agreements has
been to protect one spouse's earnings from the other's creditors.
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act introduces a new standard
for determining the validity of a premarital agreement and lists specific
subjects on which parties may and may not contract. The standard for
establishing invalidity is the highest one in use in the United States.296 It
requires the person seeking to avoid the agreement to prove either that it
was not entered into voluntarily or that it was unconscionable at the time
it was made and that the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement did not
have knowledge of the other's assets and obligations. 297 Thus, a fiance
who agreed to transmute substantial separate property to community
property without knowledge of an impecunious fiance's child support ar-
rearages should be able to avoid the agreement because she could meet
the twin tests of unconscionability and ignorance.
The most salient part of the Act for those about to become steppar-
ents is the protection it provides children. Section 5312(b) states: "[t]he
290. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5300-5317 (West Supp. 1988).
291. In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976).
292. In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973)
(waiver of spousal support), overruled on other grounds; In re Marriage of Noghrey, 169 Cal.
App. 3d 326, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985) (substantial settlement in no-fault divorce).
293. Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d at 358, 551 P.2d at 333-34, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 13-14.
294. See generally C. MARKEY, supra note 273, at 2.14[1].
295. Id.
296. BLUMBERG, supra note 233, at 122.
297. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5315 (West Supp. 1988).
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right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital
agreement." 98 The language of the Act protects all children, not only
those who are children of the marriage.299 California courts might find
themselves asked to construe section 5312(b) in a collateral attack by a
child who claims his support enforcement rights were adversely affected.
The most sympathetic situation would be one in which a noncustodial
parent with little or no nonexempt property had made a separate prop-
erty agreement. The debtor parent furnishes homemaking services to her
new spouse, who in turn supports her. The child would find no assets
against which he could execute to enforce a support award.
Prior to the adoption of the Agnos Act, courts dealt with this scena-
rio through the contempt power, finding those parents who had the ca-
pacity to work but did not in contempt of court.30 But the Agnos Act
has redefined the role of earning capacity in apportioning child sup-
port.30 1 A noncustodial mother who is the full time caretaker of young
children from her current marriage might be determined to have no earn-
ing capacity since it would not be in their best interest for her to work.
Even if this was not the case, the child might find courts reluctant to use
the contempt power against an involuntarily unemployed or disabled
parent.
If the premarital agreement was the sole barrier to executing on
property enjoyed by the obligor-parent, and the child otherwise would be
without means of support, it is difficult to see how the child's right to
support was not adversely affected by the premarital agreement. The
court could then void that provision of the agreement making the step-
parent's earnings separate property and enforce the support award as
though the property were community property. This would not guaran-
tee that the child could reach the stepparent's earnings. If the stepparent
deposited his or her earnings in an individual account uncommingled
with other property, he or she could still fall back on the protection of
Civil Code section 5120.110(b), which insulates a stepparent's uncom-
mingled community earnings from liability for the parent's child support
298. Id. § 5312(b).
299. Where the legislature intends to limit applicability to children of the marriage, it has
specifically so stated. For an example, see CAL. Civ. CODE § 4351 (West Supp. 1988) (juris-
diction to order child support in dissolution).
300. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4703 (West 1983); See also In re Marriage of Williams, 155 Cal.
App. 3d 57, 202 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1984), and cases cited therein. A court might well have con-
strued a separate property agreement made by a spouse who anticipated being a homemaker
solely supported by her new spouse as conduct indicating a deliberate attempt to avoid her
financial responsibilities to her children.
301. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4721(a) (West Supp. 1988).
November 19881
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
obligations. The child's recourse in such a case would be to levy the
stepparent's nonexempt property that would have been community prop-
erty but for the premarital agreement.
B. Comparison with Cohabitation
Given the financial uncertainty of marriage to a parent, some
couples may prefer to cohabit without marriage. Others may prefer to
cohabit for reasons unrelated to child support obligations. As has been
previously discussed, where cohabitors pool incomes and the nonparent's
earnings reduce the parent's living expenses, the cohabitor's income will
be considered in determining the noncustodial parent's ability to pay.30 2
Also, where a custodial parent cohabits and is unemployed, furnishing
both homemaking services to her cohabitor and child care services to her
children, she may find the amount of child support she is awarded re-
duced.30 3 Cohabitors thus assume the same risks as remarried couples
that the presence of children from prior relationships will reduce their
standard of living without gaining the advantages of the community
property system such as vested property rights at the termination of the
relationship.
Nevertheless, cohabitors possess at least two advantages over their
married counterparts. The first is that one cohabitor's earnings and
property are not liable for the other's debts. 304 Thus, a person cohabiting
with a noncustodial parent could not find his or her earnings or property
taken to enforce the parent's child support obligation. Another advan-
tage is that a cohabiting custodial parent who has a family home award
should not have to bear the burden of proving that continued delay in the
sale of the family home is in the children's best interest. The California
Law Revision Commission recommended that trial courts be allowed to
automatically terminate the award of any custodial parent who remar-
ried or cohabited.305 The legislature rejected this standard in favor of the
one embodied in section 4800.7(b)(2).° 6 That standard creates a rebutta-
ble presumption that further delay is no longer equitable if the custodial
parent remarries or "there is otherwise a change in circumstances affect-
ing the economic status of the parties. ' 30 7 Thus, a court would first need
302. Id § 4720(e).
303. Id. § 4729; In re Marriage of Kepley, 193 Cal. App. 3d 946, 952-53, 238 Cal. Rptr.
691, 695 (1987).
304. Planck v. Hartung, 98 Cal. App. 3d 838, 840-43, 159 Cal. Rptr. 673, 674-75 (1979).
305. Recommendation Relating to Awarding Temporary Use of Family Home, 17 CAL. L.
REVISION COMM'N REP". 261, 267 (1984).
306. For a discussion of § 4800.7, see supra notes 226-39 and accompanying text.
307. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.7(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
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to find that the cohabitation affected the economic status of the parties
before it could shift the burden of proof to the custodial parent.
C. Remaining Tensions
The current system of apportioning responsibility for child support,
with the refinements proposed, is almost equitable to the employed step-
parent. Without sacrificing the advantages of the community property
system, she can protect her earnings from liability for her spouse's obli-
gation. She can also be confident that her community earnings will result
in higher support payments only if they actually reduce her spouse's liv-
ing expenses. Once, however, she invests her community earnings in
some form of property, the earnings can be reached by creditors to satisfy
her spouse's premarital debts, including support obligations. To this ex-
tent, the stepchildren receive a windfall at the stepparent's expense. But
the stepchildren are treated like any other premarital creditors, who may
also reach such property.
The unemployed stepparent receives no such protection or assur-
ances. Because California has chosen to treat prior support obligations
like other premarital debts for purposes of liability, the unemployed step-
parent finds that all of the community, including his or her share, is lia-
ble for his or her spouse's support obligation. This is a specific instance
of preferring premarital creditors generally over subsequent spouses.
Where the subsequent spouse has no earnings, the premarital creditors
can reach neither more nor less than if the debtor had not remarried.
And where the subsequent spouse has community earnings and invests
them in nonexempt property, the creditors are able to reach more prop-
erty than if the debtor had not remarried. The employed subsequent
spouse can protect her earnings through changes in form by making a
premarital separate property agreement. However, a premarital agree-
ment making any part of the debtor-parent's earnings the unemployed
stepparent's separate property would likely be set aside as a fraudulent
conveyance against the interests of premarital creditors.
Despite the community property system's assumption that the value
of the homemaker's services is equal to the value of the wage earner's
income, the unemployed spouse will find that although he or she contrib-
utes the full measure of his or her services to the new community, he or
she does not receive half the value of his or her spouse's earnings. This
result is inevitable given California's preference for premarital creditors.
It is also a judgment that children should not have to make do with less
while their father supports a full-time homemaker-and their mother un-
doubtedly has to work to make up the difference. Those who believe that
November 1988]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the superiority of the community property system over the common-law
system lies in the value and dignity it accords to the homemaker spouse
must recognize that the theory yields to a preference for premarital credi-
tors and particularly to the reality of children's needs. In most mar-
riages, the existence of premarital debts is either not a substantial issue or
is one that is resolved through payment early in the marriage. However,
support obligations are a unique class of premarital debt. They have the
potential to continue for many years, often into subsequent marriages.
They also represent large outlays for which the new community receives
no benefit, unlike other typical premarital debts for consumer goods that
are enjoyed by both spouses.
VII. CONCLUSION
California has attempted to resolve the conflict between the rights of
children to receive support from their remarried parents and the rights of
stepparents to the benefits of the community property system. Recently
enacted statutes have distinguished the issues of liability for child sup-
port debts from those of whose resources should be considered in deter-
mining child support awards. The debt liability statute appears to
provide certainty and security to the stepparent who can afford to segre-
gate his or her earnings from the parent's. The employed stepparent can
shelter earnings from liability without making a separate property agree-
ment and thereby forfeiting the benefits of the community property sys-
tem. However, two serious weaknesses arise from this approach. First,
the failure to coordinate the debt liability statutes, which clearly cover
liability during the stepparent's marriage, with other code sections gov-
erning debt liability upon divorce or death, creates needless uncertainty
and makes financial planning difficult. Second, the statutory scheme pro-
vides no security to the homemaker stepparent, who is not allowed to
shelter any portion of the community property from liability for child
support obligations.
In determining whose resources should be considered in setting
child support awards, California has chosen flexibility over certainty. By
focusing on the extent to which the stepparent's income reduces the par-
ent's living expenses, the Agnos Act essentially makes separate property
agreements irrelevant. The decision to base child support awards on the
remarried parent's standard of living, rather than on how the parent and
stepparent have agreed to handle their resources, provides an important
protection to the children. The general directions of the statute still need
to be refined by specific guidelines at the trial court level. These guide-
lines should consider such factors as whether the obligor-parent and step-
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parent have children of their own, whether a parent's income has
decreased because of the remarriage, and whether a parent contributes
valuable child rearing services in addition to financial support, as well as
whether a stepparent's shared income reduces the parent's living ex-
penses. The courts need to guard against the imposition of an inequitable
support burden on the custodial parent/stepparent household. This
could easily occur if both stepparents' incomes were treated similarly,
without considering the differences in in-kind contributions the two
households make to the children's support.
Before California adopted the current statutes on stepparent respon-
sibility for child support, Professor Bruch argued that, "[i]f [custodial]
stepparents were required to support their stepchildren,... a 'negative
dower' would be created. Rather than bringing the once traditional
dowry to a marriage, a woman with custody of her children would bring
financial liabilities with her, decreasing the already impaired likelihood of
her remarriage. '"308
California has chosen not to place personal support responsibility on
stepparents, but has granted courts discretion to consider the earnings of
both custodial and noncustodial stepparents in determining the parents'
shares of their support obligation. Thus, all parents bring a "negative
dowry" to their subsequent marriages. That "negative dowry" is
smaller, however, because it is borne by both parents rather than the
custodial parent alone. Legal responsibility for child support remains
where it belongs, on both the child's parents, to be apportioned according
to their abilities to pay. But, indirectly and inevitably, stepparents con-
tribute a portion of what would otherwise have been their community
property.
308. Bruch, supra note 29, at 60.
November 1988]
150 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:73
